

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. XIII, NO. 334

NOVEMBER 18, 1945

PERIODICAL ROOM
GENERAL LIBRARY
UNIV. OF MICH

In this issue

ATOMIC ENERGY

Agreed Declaration by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister of Canada

WORLD COOPERATION

Address by the Secretary of State

PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND UNDERSTANDING IN AMERICAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP

Address by Under Secretary Acheson

FINAL ACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE ESTAB- LISHMENT OF AN EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

FOREIGN-TRADE RECONSTRUCTION—THE AMERICAS

Address by Assistant Secretary Braden

SURVEY OF ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS

By John V. Lovitt

*For complete contents
see inside cover*



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN

VOL. XIII • No. 334



PUBLICATION 2430

November 18, 1945

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest is included.

Publications of the Department, cumulative lists of which are published at the end of each quarter, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

The BULLETIN, published with the approval of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., to whom all purchase orders, with accompanying remittance, should be sent. The subscription price is \$3.50 a year; a single copy is 10 cents.

Contents

AMERICAN REPUBLICS	
Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense: Appointment of Pierre de L. Boal as U. S. Member	792
Fourth Inter-American Press Conference	792
EUROPE	
Problems of Security and Understanding in American-Soviet Friendship. Address by Under Secretary Acheson	793
Situation of Jews in Europe. Statement by the President	793
Bulgarian Elections: Communication From U. S. Political Representative	793
FAR EAST	
Assistance to China in Effecting Japanese Surrender	812
United States Forces in Korea	812
Anniversary of Philippine Commonwealth. Statement by the President	812
NEAR EAST	
Greek Elections: Providing for the Representation of the United States in the Observation of Elections in Greece	792
CULTURAL COOPERATION	
Cultural Cooperation With the Soviet Union. Address by Charles J. Child	815
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS	
Survey of Economic Policy Toward the European Neutrals. By John V. Lovitt	777
Foreign-Trade Reconstruction—The Americas. Address by Assistant Secretary Braden	790
United States Participation in UNRRA: President's Message to Congress	807
Statement by Under Secretary Acheson	808
Statement by Assistant Secretary Clayton	808
Reduction of Required Gold Coverage of Philippine Currency	814
GENERAL	
Atomic Energy: Agreed Declaration by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister of Canada	781
World Cooperation. Address by the Secretary of State	783
Nobel Peace Prize of 1945 Awarded to Cordell Hull: Exchange of Messages Between President of Nobel Committee and Mr. Hull	819
Statement by Mr. Hull	819
Letter From President Truman to Mr. Hull	819
UNITED NATIONS	
The Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization of the United Nations: Report on the London Conference	798
Final Act of the United Nations Conference for the Establishment of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	801
TREATY INFORMATION	
Protocol to Armistice Agreement With Finland: Canada, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union	789
Final Act of the United Nations Conference for the Establishment of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	801
Extradition Treaty Between United States and Canada. Transmittal of Protocol	814
Ratification of the Charter of the United Nations: Australia, Liberia, Costa Rica, Colombia, Union of South Africa, Mexico, Canada	817
Action Taken on the Charter of the United Nations	818
THE DEPARTMENT	
Appointment of Officers	814
Change in the Name of the Commodities Division to the International Resources Division	814
THE FOREIGN SERVICE	
Consular Offices	814
PUBLICATIONS	
Anglo-American Caribbean Commission	782
Foreign Commerce Weekly	818
THE CONGRESS	820

Survey of Economic Policy Toward the European Neutrals

BY JOHN V. LOVITT¹

THE POSITION of the several European neutrals in terms of Allied economic policy varies greatly. During most of the war Sweden and Switzerland were completely surrounded by the Axis, yet they were not entirely cut off from the outside world. Sweden was permitted a limited trade via Göteborg, and Switzerland via Genoa. This trade was subject to both Allied and Axis control. Economic policy toward Turkey and Portugal was largely influenced by the fact that they were allies of Great Britain. Spain, while neither an ally of nor geographically surrounded by the Axis, was of particular interest to the military in connection with the invasion of North Africa. In political complexion the neutrals vary from the ancient democracy of Switzerland to the dictatorship of Franco.

These dissimilarities made it necessary to deal with each neutral separately.

Although hostilities have ended, dissimilarities among the neutrals still persist. Some of these dissimilarities grow out of continuing obligations under the war trade agreements; some are due to the various degrees of cooperation of the particular neutral in post-war plans of the Allies; and some result from the relative importance economically of the particular neutral to the reconstruction of Europe.

There are, however, factors common to all the neutrals which have made possible the formulation of broad policies of fairly uniform application. In the space of this article those factors alone will be explored, to the exclusion of a detailed consideration of each neutral separately.

The War Period

THE PREDOMINANT OBJECTIVE during the war was to obtain the elimination or drastic reduction of the economic aid which the neutrals gave the Axis war potential. Chief importance was placed on the exports to the Axis of ball-bearings and iron ore from Sweden; arms, ammunition, and certain precision tools from Switzerland; wolfram from Spain and Portugal; and chrome from Turkey. There were also certain special quasi-military objectives which the Allies sought to realize through economic pressure. Among the more important objectives of this latter type were the cessation of enemy military traffic in war material and in troops on leave across Sweden to Norway and Finland, the transit of loot and war materials across Switzerland between Germany and northern Italy, and the procurement of small quantities of highly strategic material needed by the military, notably chronometer- and jewel-bearings from Switzerland and certain types of ball-bearings from Sweden.

To accomplish their purposes the Allies had in their arsenal various weapons of economic warfare of which the blockade was the basic device. The blockade was effective because of the fact that, although the neutrals obtained a large part of their essential imports from Axis Europe, they were all dependent on certain supplies which could be obtained only from overseas. Petroleum was probably the most strategic of these supplies,

¹ Mr. Lovitt is an Adviser in the War Areas Economic Division and Chief of the Section on Blockade and the European Neutrals, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State.

but certain food items and some industrial raw materials became almost equally as important as the war progressed and as European stockpiles became depleted.

It is interesting to observe that, although the blockade was the most effective in history, in the sense of international law it was not a blockade but was an extension of the belligerent right to condemn contraband. The old rule that conditional contraband (goods susceptible to both military and civilian use) could be condemned only if destined for the enemy armed forces had no meaning under the conditions of "total war" when all materials were being used to maintain the enemy's fighting strength. Therefore, the distinction between conditional contraband and absolute contraband (war material which could be condemned if destined merely to enemy territory) disappeared. Thus, generally speaking, all goods destined for enemy territory were subject to condemnation.

It was, however, often difficult to prove ultimate enemy destination when goods were consigned to neutral territory. It is true that when a neutral imported a commodity in amounts greatly in excess of normal a presumption of on-shipment to the enemy would arise, but such a presumption was of limited and uncertain application in the Prize Court. The position in international law with respect to enemy exports was also unsatisfactory from the Allied point of view because the Declaration of Paris protected enemy goods shipped in neutral vessels. The effectiveness of the legal sanctions of the blockade was greatly enhanced by the Reprisal Orders-in-Council (1940), which raised a legal presumption that all goods not covered by a navicert (a passport through the blockade issued under Allied authority) were destined to the enemy and all goods exported from a neutral port from which goods of enemy origin or ownership might have been shipped were liable to condemnation unless covered by a Certificate of Origin and Interest (the equivalent of the navicert on the export side). Presumptions, however, could be rebutted, and even the legal basis of the Orders-in-Council—the right of retaliation—is questioned by many jurists. The legal sanctions, therefore, had to be supplemented by economic sanctions. Thus,

² For an article on the Allied blockade by Mr. Lovitt, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1944, p. 597.

through their control of insurance facilities, bunkers, and supplies, the Allies could prevent the sailing of a ship unless all her cargo was navicerted. This means of enforcing the blockade proved in the end to be the most effective.

By means of the blockade the Allies achieved a control over both neutral imports and exports. This position, together with their control over most of the important sources of supply outside Europe, was used as a basis to negotiate a series of wartime arrangements with the neutrals by which, in return for import quotas, the neutrals agreed to reduce strategic exports to the Axis and to meet other requirements of the Allied economic-warfare program.²

The blockade was supplemented by blacklisting firms in neutral territory giving aid to the Axis. This *inter alia* prevented these firms from receiving imports from overseas because a navicert would not be issued for a blacklisted consignee. Through the threat of listing or as a condition to de-listing, reductions were brought about in an individual firm's exports to the Axis. In some cases preclusive purchasing was used to immobilize stocks of strategic material which might otherwise be acquired by the Axis.

The policy which was followed by the Allies in making use of these weapons of economic warfare to accomplish their objectives has nowhere been better stated than by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in a broadcast of April 9, 1944:

"This growth of our strength entails consequences in our foreign policy. Let us look first at our relations with the neutral nations.

"In the two years following Pearl Harbor, while we were mustering our strength and helping to restore that of our Allies, our relations with these neutral nations and their attitude toward our enemies were conditioned by the position in which we found ourselves. We have constantly sought to keep before them what they, of course, know—that upon our victory hangs their very existence and freedom as independent nations. We have sought in every way to reduce the aid which their trade with the enemy gives him and to increase the strength which we might draw from them. But our power was limited. They and we have continually been forced to accept compromises which we certainly would not have chosen.

"That period, I believe, is rapidly drawing to

a close. It is clear to all that our strength and that of our Allies now makes only one outcome of this war possible. That strength now makes it clear that we are not asking these neutral nations to expose themselves to certain destruction when we ask them not to prolong the war, with its consequences of suffering and death, by sending aid to the enemy.

"We can no longer acquiesce in these nations' drawing upon the resources of the allied world when they at the same time contribute to the death of troops whose sacrifice contributes to their salvation as well as ours. We have scrupulously respected the sovereignty of these nations; and we have not coerced, nor shall we coerce, any nation to join us in the fight. We have said to these countries that it is no longer necessary for them to purchase protection against aggression by furnishing aid to our enemy—whether it be by permitting official German agents to carry on their activities of espionage against the Allies within neutral borders, or by sending to Germany the essential ingredients of the steel which kills our soldiers, or by permitting highly skilled workers and factories to supply products which can no longer issue from the smoking ruins of German factories. We ask them only, but with insistence, to cease aiding our enemy."³

Throughout the war the success of Allied economic-warfare measures was cumulative, and months before the surrender of Germany all the Allied objectives had been obtained. To touch upon the highlights only—Sweden stopped the export of ball-bearings to the Axis and the military transit across Sweden in the summer of 1944. By the end of the year she had stopped all exports to Germany. Switzerland had greatly reduced her exports to Germany in 1943 and by December 1944 had eliminated the export of most strategic items and had stopped the transit across her territory of loot and Axis war material. A further agreement with the Swiss in March brought Swiss-German trade to a standstill. Portugal had stopped the export of wolfram by June 6, 1944 and had previously ceded the Allies air bases in the Azores. Spain embargoed the export of wolfram on February 1 of the same year as a result of having been cut off from petroleum supplies from overseas. Turkey had ceased the export of chrome by April 20, 1944.

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 15, 1944, p. 336.

The Post-Hostilities Period¹

WITH THE END of hostilities in Europe the entire picture changed. Late in 1944, in anticipation of the defeat of Germany, an inter-departmental committee approved a statement of economic policy toward the neutrals of which the salient factors were:

1. The neutrals would obtain enactment and implementation of:

a. effective measures which would assist in the restitution of loot, in the preventing of secretion of flight capital, and in the disclosing of all Axis assets; which would prevent export of enemy property into or through neutral territory; and which would circumvent German economic penetration or control of neutral economies;

b. measures which would recognize Allied authority within their jurisdiction over all enemy assets; and

c. effective measures which would prevent goods, particularly those of low volume but of high strategic value, from going from or through their countries to Japan. (Now obsolete.)

2. Obtaining of neutral cooperation in resolving the confusion of property relationships arising from enemy occupation of various Allied countries and the enemy's attempts to cloak their dealings through neutral agents.

3. Obtaining of agreement with the neutral countries not to obstruct the program adopted by the Allies for continuing the Statutory and Proclaimed Lists, known as "blacklists".

4. Preventing of the disruption, by neutral competition, of Allied procurement arrangements for goods in tight supply.

5. Enlisting of a contribution by the neutral countries in proportion to their resources for the relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas.

6. Obtaining of the cooperation of the neutral countries in supplying Allied requirements.

With the exception of the first and second, these objectives have been largely achieved. The blacklists have been revised but are still in force and, while in some quarters they are not officially recognized by the neutral governments involved *modus operandi*, have been devised with the consent of the neutrals to prevent goods from overseas from reaching blacklisted firms. The neutrals have readily agreed to coordinate their purchases of commodities in short supply with Allied

programs of procurement and distribution. In one form or another they have shown their willingness to assist in the rehabilitation of devastated areas. They have also facilitated the procurement by Allied military and other authorities of large amounts of indigenous products and manufactures.

With respect to the first two objectives, although considerable progress has been made, much is still to be desired. Where they are requested to do so, the neutrals have agreed to take a census and freeze Axis assets. They have also in principle agreed to restore looted property, but, except in the case of Sweden, procedures to accomplish this purpose are cumbersome. The neutrals have not, however, agreed to give Allied authorities the information derived from the census in the detail and form which the Allies have requested; nor have they recognized, within their jurisdictions, Allied authority over enemy assets; nor have they been sufficiently cooperative in dealing with Axis personnel, particularly technicians. The failure of the neutrals to cooperate completely with the Allies on these "Safehaven" objectives is at present the sore spot in Allied relations with the European neutrals. The importance of measures to prevent the neutrals from becoming a "Safehaven" for enemy assets and technical personnel is directly connected with preventing Germany from again attaining the position to threaten the peace of the world.⁴ It is the firm resolve of the Allies that the neutrals shall not wittingly or unwittingly constitute a base where the resurgence of the Nazis can be nurtured on hidden assets and where their technicians can continue their development of new weapons of destruction.

A brief reference should be made to the position of the neutrals with respect to supply. This position was authoritatively stated on June 19, 1945 by Acting Secretary Grew in a letter to Mr. Crowley, Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration, Mr. Krug, Chairman of the War Production Board, Secretary Wickard of the Department of Agriculture, and Judge Jones, Administrator of the War Food Administration, as follows:

⁴ For discussion of the Safehaven program, see Assistant Secretary Clayton's statement in BULLETIN of July 1, 1945, p. 27.

⁵ Announced by FEA in its Export Bulletin No. 276, Sept. 10, 1945, the summary of which was printed in the BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1945, p. 397.

"During the past several years our economic relations with the various European neutral governments have been largely dominated by considerations of economic warfare and other factors directly or indirectly related to the prosecution of the war. The quantities of the supplies which these neutrals were allowed to draw from all overseas sources, including this country, reflected these considerations.

"The end of hostilities in Europe, however, has resulted in the complete rupture of economic relations between Germany and the neutrals, and it is now appropriate to restate the policy under which supplies should be granted to the European neutrals from this country.

"The Department, as a matter of policy, now desires to make clear that the supply needs of the European neutrals should be accorded a position clearly subordinate to the essential requirements of the liberated areas. Of course occasions may arise from time to time in the future which will render it desirable to assume specific supply undertakings on our part; for example, in connection with provision by certain of the neutrals of local resources for the liberated areas or the attainment of our residual economic warfare objectives."

Since the end of hostilities it has been the policy of this Government to remove wartime restrictions on international trade as rapidly as possible, but it is still necessary to control quantitatively neutral imports of commodities in short supply and to deny imports to firms on the blacklist. It has been possible, however, to decentralize the navicert system and to avoid the delays instant to referring of applications to London. This decentralization has been worked out with the neutrals by placing reliance upon import regulations established by the neutrals at Allied request to restrict to quantitative limits those items in short supply.

A great step forward in freeing trade was taken by the FEA in the issuance of export regulations withdrawing all controls over commercial shipment of most commodities to most countries throughout the world.⁵ As a result of these new export regulations, all exports except a few in short supply are placed on general license. All the neutrals except Spain may import these commodities from the United States without quantitative limitation and without an export license.

(Continued on page 786)

Atomic Energy¹

AGREED DECLARATION BY

*The President of the United States,
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and
The Prime Minister of Canada.*

[Released to the press by the White House November 15]

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA have issued the following statement.

1. We recognize that the application of recent scientific discoveries to the methods and practice of war has placed at the disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown, against which there can be no adequate military defence, and in the employment of which no single nation can in fact have a monopoly.

2. We desire to emphasize that the responsibility for devising means to ensure that the new discoveries shall be used for the benefit of mankind, instead of as a means of destruction, rests not on our nations alone, but upon the whole civilized world. Nevertheless, the progress that we have made in the development and use of atomic energy demands that we take an initiative in the matter, and we have accordingly met together to consider the possibility of international action:

- (a) To prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes
- (b) To promote the use of recent and future advances in scientific knowledge, particularly in the utilization of atomic energy, for peaceful and humanitarian ends.

3. We are aware that the only complete protection for the civilized world from the destructive use of scientific knowledge lies in the prevention of war. No system of safeguards that can be devised will of itself provide an effective guarantee against production of atomic weapons by a nation bent on aggression. Nor can we ignore the possibility of the development of other weapons, or of new methods of warfare, which may constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic energy.

4. Representing as we do, the three countries which possess the knowledge essential to the use of atomic energy, we declare at the outset our willingness, as a first contribution, to proceed with the exchange of fundamental scientific information and the interchange of scientists and scientific literature for peaceful ends with any nation that will fully reciprocate.

5. We believe that the fruits of scientific research should be made available to all nations, and that freedom of investigation and free interchange of ideas are essential to the progress of knowledge. In pursuance of this policy, the basic scientific information essential to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes has already been made available to the world. It is our intention that all further information of this character that may become available from time to time shall be similarly treated. We trust that other nations will adopt the same policy, thereby creating an atmosphere of reciprocal confidence in which political agreement and cooperation will flourish.

6. We have considered the question of the disclosure of detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy. The military exploitation of atomic energy depends, in large part, upon the same methods and processes as would be required for industrial uses.

We are not convinced that the spreading of the specialized information regarding the practical application of atomic energy, before it is possible to devise effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations, would contribute

¹ The Secretary of State announced immediately after release of the declaration that texts were cabled to the foreign ministers of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and later in the day he advised that the remainder of the United Nations were informed of the declaration.

to a constructive solution of the problem of the atomic bomb. On the contrary we think it might have the opposite effect. We are, however, prepared to share, on a reciprocal basis with others of the United Nations, detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised.

7. In order to attain the most effective means of entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and promoting its widest use for industrial and humanitarian purposes, we are of the opinion that at the earliest practicable date a Commission should be set up under the United Nations Organization to prepare recommendations for submission to the Organization.

The Commission should be instructed to proceed with the utmost dispatch and should be authorized to submit recommendations from time to time dealing with separate phases of its work.

In particular the Commission should make specific proposals:

(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends,

(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes,

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction,

(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

8. The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken. Specifically it is considered that the Commission might well devote its attention first to the wide exchange of scientists and scientific information, and as a second stage to the development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials.

9. Faced with the terrible realities of the application of science to destruction, every nation will realize more urgently than before the overwhelming need to maintain the rule of law among nations and to banish the scourge of war from the earth. This can only be brought about by giving

wholehearted support to the United Nations Organization, and by consolidating and extending its authority, thus creating conditions of mutual trust in which all peoples will be free to devote themselves to the arts of peace. It is our firm resolve to work without reservation to achieve these ends.

The City of Washington

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 15, 1945

HARRY S. TRUMAN

President of the United States

C. R. ATTLEE

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

Prime Minister of Canada

Anglo-American Caribbean Commission

The Report of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain for the Year 1944 has been published by the Commission.

The report includes the following topics: auxiliary bodies of the Commission, the Barbados conference, food, public health, the Caribbean travel industry, the *West Indian Radio Newspaper*, the Schooner Pool, a topographical survey, the Caribbean Research Council, Caribbean labor in the United States, meetings during the year, and personnel. Appended to the report are the joint communiqué of March 9, 1942, a list of delegates and advisers to the West Indian Conference of 1944, texts of the exchange of notes between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on the Barbados conference, and the text of the circular letter from the British Secretary of State for the Colonies on Resolution 4 of the Barbados conference.

Copies of the report may be obtained from the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

World Cooperation

Address by THE SECRETARY OF STATE¹

[Released to the press November 17]

When I accepted Charleston's very gracious invitation to return to the city of my birth and the scenes of my younger days, I thought that nothing I could say here would interest you more than world trade.

Charleston, being one of the oldest ports in America, certainly has a vital interest in the restoration of world commerce.

Since accepting this invitation to be with you I have participated in a conference in Washington which concerns every human being and civilization itself.

Therefore, before expressing some views on international trade, I wish to comment briefly on the efforts we are making to control atomic energy so that it may be used not for war and destruction but for the peace and happiness of the world.

The full significance of the release of atomic energy is not quickly or easily comprehended. As it happened, in my capacity as Director of War Mobilization I was well aware of the awesome character of the great experiment that we then referred to as the Manhattan Project.

Later, during the short period I was out of the government service, it became clear to the scientists that an atomic bomb was an immediate practical possibility. At that time I was asked to serve as the President's representative on the committee which, under the chairmanship of Secretary of War Stimson, laid the plans for the New Mexico experiment.

Despite this experience, I know that I cannot presently evaluate the true impact of this discovery upon the future of the world.

But from the day the first bomb fell on Hiroshima one thing has been clear to all of us. The civilized world cannot survive an atomic war.

This is the challenge to our generation. To meet it we must let our minds be bold. At the same time we must not imagine wishfully that overnight there can arise full grown a world government wise and strong enough to protect all of us and tolerant and democratic enough to command our willing loyalty.

If we are to preserve the continuity of civilized life, we must work with the materials at hand, improving and adding to existing institutions until they can meet the stern test of our time.

Accordingly, the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada—the partners in the historic scientific and engineering undertaking that resulted in the release of atomic energy—have taken the first step in an effort to rescue the world from a desperate armament race.

In their statement they declared their willingness to make immediate arrangements for the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful purposes. Much of this kind of basic information essential to the development of atomic energy has already been disseminated. We shall continue to make such information available.

In addition to these immediate proposals the conference recommended that at the earliest practicable date a commission should be established under the United Nations Organization. This can be done within 60 days.

It would be the duty of this Commission to draft recommendations for extending the international exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful purposes, for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes, and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

The Commission would recommend effective safeguards by way of inspection or other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

Such protection would be afforded by having the work proceed by stages.

As a starting point the Commission might recommend the wide exchange of scientists and scientific information. The next step might be the

¹ Delivered at Charleston, S.C., in connection with the "Jimmy Byrnes Homecoming Day" on Nov. 16, 1945 and broadcast over the network of the National Broadcasting Company.

sharing of knowledge about the raw materials necessary to the release of atomic energy.

The successful completion of each stage would develop the confidence to proceed to the next stage.

A very serious question arises, however, when we reach the stage of exchanging detailed information about the practical industrial application of atomic energy. The thought to be borne in mind here is that up to a certain rather advanced point, the so-called "know-how" of production is the same whether atomic energy is to be stored in bombs or harnessed as power for a peaceful industrial purpose.

And so it was necessary for the conferees to determine, in the light of this fact, how soon information concerning the practical application of atomic energy should be disseminated.

Only one answer was possible. Until effective safeguards can be developed, in the form of international inspection or otherwise, the secrets of production know-how must be held, in the words of the President, as a sacred trust—a trust in the exercise of which we are already under definite international obligation.

Under the Charter of the United Nations we have pledged ourselves not to use force except in support of the purposes and principles of the Charter. The suggestion that we are using the atomic bomb as a diplomatic or military threat against any nation is not only untrue in fact but is a wholly unwarranted reflection upon the American Government and people.

It is one of the inherent characteristics of our democracy that we can fight a war only with the genuine consent of our people. No President in the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress could authorize an atomic bombing without running the risk of impeachment.

No one who knows the peace-loving temper of our people can believe that our Congress would adopt a declaration of war contrary to our solemnly undertaken obligations under the United Nations Charter.

The history of 1914 to 1917 and of 1939 to 1941 is convincing proof of the slowness of Congress to declare war. There is surely no reason to believe that it would be more eager to engage in a future war more terrible than any we have known.

While we consider it proper and necessary, therefore, to continue for a time to hold these production secrets in trust, this period need not be unnecessarily prolonged.

As experience demonstrates that the sharing of information is full and unreserved, it is to be hoped that the exchange for peaceful purposes can be extended to some and eventually to all the practical applications of atomic energy and of other scientific discoveries. This is the objective we seek.

It is our purpose and grave duty to act in our relations with other nations with the boldness and generosity that the atomic age demands of us. No officials of government have ever been called upon to make a decision fraught with more serious consequences. We must act. But we will act in a manner that will not undermine our safety or the safety of the world.

Our declaration of willingness to exchange immediately the basic scientific information and our plans for the setting up of a commission under United Nations sponsorship have been sent by me to members of the United Nations Organization. We look forward to their cooperation.

No one appreciates more keenly than those who have advanced these proposals that they represent a very modest first step in what is certain to prove a long and difficult journey. I wish to emphasize our conviction that the creation and development of safeguards to protect us all from unspeakable destruction is not the exclusive responsibility of the United States or Great Britain or Canada. It is the responsibility of all governments.

Without the united effort and unremitting cooperation of all the nations of the world, there will be no enduring and effective protection against the atomic bomb. There will be no protection against bacteriological warfare, an even more frightful method of human destruction.

Atomic energy is a new instrument that has been given to man. He may use it to destroy himself and a civilization which centuries of sweat and toil and blood have built. Or he may use it to win for himself new dignity and a better and more abundant life.

If we can move gradually but surely toward free and unlimited exchange of scientific and industrial information, to control and perhaps eventually to eliminate the manufacture of atomic weapons and other weapons capable of mass destruction, we will have progressed toward achieving freedom from fear.

But it is not enough to banish atomic or bacteriological warfare. We must banish war. To that great goal of humanity we must ever rededicate our hearts and strength.

To help us move toward that goal we must guard not only against military threats to world security but economic threats to world well-being.

Political peace and economic warfare cannot long exist together. If we are going to have peace in this world, we must learn to live together and work together. We must be able to do business together.

Nations that will not do business with one another or try to exclude one another from doing business with other countries are not likely in the long run to be good neighbors.

Trade blackouts, just as much as other types of blackouts, breed distrust and disunity. Business relations bring nations and their peoples closer together and, perhaps more than anything else, promote good-will and determination for peace.

Many of the existing restrictions on world trade result from present-day conditions and practices, largely growing out of the war.

Many countries, and not least Great Britain, had to sacrifice their foreign earning power to win the war. They have sold most of their foreign stocks and bonds, borrowed heavily abroad, let their foreign commerce go, and lost ships and factories to enemy attack.

Their needs for foreign goods are great and pressing, but they lack foreign exchange, that is, purchasing power to buy abroad. Without aid they cannot see their way to buy as they used to abroad, not to speak of the additional things they need from abroad to rehabilitate their shattered and devastated economies.

In a situation of this kind what can a country do? It can seek to borrow the foreign currencies it needs, which will enable it to apply the liberal principles of trade which must be the basis of any permanent prosperity.

Or it can draw in its belt. It can reduce the standard of living of its people, conserve in every way the foreign currencies that it finds hard to get, and transfer its foreign trade by government decree to countries whose currencies are easier to obtain.

In the latter way lies increased discrimination and the division of the commerce of the world into exclusive blocs. We cannot oppose exclusive blocs if we do not help remove the conditions which impel other nations, often against their will, to create them.

We must not only oppose these exclusive trading blocs but we must also cooperate with other nations in removing conditions which breed discrimination in world trade.

Whatever foreign loans we make will of course increase the markets for American products, for in the long run the dollars we lend can be spent only in this country.

The countries devastated by the war want to get back to work. They want to get back to production which will enable them to support themselves. When they can do this, they will buy goods from us. America, in helping them, will be helping herself.

We cannot play Santa Claus to the world but we can make loans to governments whose credit is good, provided such governments will make changes in commercial policies which will make it possible for us to increase our trade with them.

In addition to loans, lend-lease settlements, and the disposal of our surplus war materials, we have been discussing with Great Britain the principle of commercial relations—principles we want to see applied by all nations in the post-war world.

These are the same liberal principles which my friend and predecessor, Cordell Hull, urged for so many years.

They are based on the conviction that what matters most in trade is not the buttressing of particular competitive positions but the increase of productive employment, the increase of production, and the increase of general prosperity.

The reasons for poverty and hunger are no longer the stinginess of nature. Modern knowledge makes it technically possible for mankind to produce enough good things to go around. The world's present capacity to produce gives it the greatest opportunity in history to increase the standards of living for all peoples of the world.

Trade between countries is one of the greatest forces leading to the fuller use of these tremendously expanded productive powers. But the world will lose this opportunity to improve the lot of her peoples if their countries do not learn to trade as neighbors and friends. If we are going to have a real people's peace, world trade cannot be throttled by burdensome restrictions.

Some of these restrictions are imposed by government decree, others by private combination. They must be removed if we are to have full employment.

To do this it will be necessary to agree upon some general rules, and to apply them in detail. We shall shortly submit to the peoples of the world our views about these matters.

We intend to propose that commercial quotas and embargoes be restricted to a few really necessary cases, and that discrimination in their application be avoided.

We intend to propose that tariffs be reduced and tariff preferences be eliminated. The Trade Agreements Act is our standing offer to negotiate to that end.

We intend to propose that subsidies, in general, should be the subject of international discussion, and that subsidies on exports should be confined to exceptional cases, under general rules, as soon as the period of emergency adjustment is over.

We intend to propose that governments conducting public enterprises in foreign trade should agree to give fair treatment to the commerce of all friendly states, that they should make their purchases and sales on purely economic grounds, and that they should avoid using a monopoly of imports to give excessive protection to their own producers.

We intend to propose that international cartels and monopolies should be prevented by international action from restricting the commerce of the world.

We intend to propose that the special problems of the great primary commodities should be studied internationally, and that consuming countries should have an equal voice with producing countries in whatever decisions may be made.

We intend to propose that the efforts of all countries to maintain full and regular employment should be guided by the rule that no country should solve its domestic problems by measures that would prevent the expansion of world trade, and no country is at liberty to export its unemployment to its neighbors.

We intend to propose that an International Trade Organization be created, under the Economic and Social Council, as an integral part of the structure of the United Nations.

We intend to propose that the United Nations call an International Conference on Trade and Employment to deal with all these problems.

In preparation for that Conference we intend to go forward with actual negotiations with several countries for the reduction of trade barriers under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

Just when these negotiations will commence has not been determined. They will be announced in the usual way, as required by the act, and due notice will be given in order that all interested persons may be heard before the detailed offers to be made by the United States are settled.

Success in those negotiations will be the soundest preparation for the general conference we hope will be called by the United Nations Organization.

By proposing that the United Nations Organization appoint a commission to consider the subject of atomic energy and by proposing that the Organization likewise call a conference to enable nations to consider the problems of international trade, we demonstrate our confidence in that Organization as an effective instrumentality for world cooperation and world peace.

After the first World War we rejected the plea of Woodrow Wilson and refused to join the League of Nations. Our action contributed to the ineffectiveness of the League.

Now the situation is different. We have sponsored the United Nations Organization. We are giving it our whole-hearted and enthusiastic support. We recognize our responsibility in the affairs of the world. We shall not evade that responsibility.

With other nations of the world we shall walk hand in hand in the paths of peace in the hope that all peoples can find freedom from fear and freedom from want.

EUROPEAN NEUTRALS—Continued from page 780.

Checking against the blacklist now takes place in the issuance of the customs clearance instead of in the issuance of the former export license. In the case of Spain all exports are still subject to individual export licenses.

As commodities cease to be classified as short-supply items, they will come under general license and trade restrictions will gradually vanish.

Our economic policy toward the European neutrals has thus moved from a negative to a positive policy. The emphasis during the blockade period was placed on stopping neutral trade with the enemy. The effort now is to recreate as soon as possible normal international trade and to integrate the economies of the neutrals with programs for the rehabilitation of devastated Europe and for the preservation of peace.

Problems of Security and Understanding in American-Soviet Friendship

Address by UNDER SECRETARY ACHESON¹

[Released to the press November 15]

Friendship between nations, as between individuals—genuine friendship—is something that grows spontaneously. It isn't easy to promote. It never can be forced. Governments can set the tone of international relations, but in the long run it's the people who call the tune.

The word *friendship* has been applied so liberally and so loosely to international relations that it has lost much of its meaning. On this important occasion I shall try to use the word with all the care and respect that it deserves.

What are the factors that encourage close and friendly relations between the American and Soviet peoples? What are the obstacles in the way of a satisfactory friendship between us?

To say that there are overwhelming reasons why we should be friends is not to say that we are friends. To describe the bonds that unite us for better or for worse, on this miniature and crowded planet, is not to prove that we are happily united.

Now I don't propose to enter tonight into a philosophic discussion of the anatomy of friendship. But there are certain conditions that usually exist between friends, and where they don't exist you are almost certain to find something less than complete friendship.

One of those conditions might be described as an absence of tension. Friends may argue, disagree, and even quarrel, but they are relaxed with each other, in spite of their differences. They accept their disagreements as a normal part of the give and take of friendship.

To put it another way, friends are not forever taking each other apart—until each becomes obsessed and exasperated with the contradictions of the other's personality. They have accepted the terms of friendship, and they are not impelled to dig up the roots of friendship daily to see how the plant is growing.

To do this seems to me both silly and futile. Certainly it's not the way personal or international friendships are made or preserved. But in all

honesty it must be admitted that there is a good deal of this sort of thing going on in both countries.

Judging from the way our national temperatures rise and fall in relation to day-to-day events, you would think we had had no experience of living together in the same world. As a matter of fact, we have had a long and close experience, dating from the time when President Jefferson and Czar Alexander the First carried on a warm and friendly correspondence.

For nearly a century and a half we have gotten along well—remarkably well, when you consider that our forms of government, our economic systems, and our social habits have never been similar.

Certainly the contrast between our ways of life and our political institutions is no greater today, with a Communist Russia, than it was in the time of Jefferson and Czar Alexander the First, or during the period of the Civil War, when Abraham Lincoln and Czar Alexander the Second guided our respective nations in a friendly collaboration of vital importance to us in our time of trial.

In perspective, the long history of amicable relations between the American and Russian peoples compares favorably with the history of our relations with the other great nations—not excluding France and Great Britain. By any standards of international relations, the record is good.

When I say this I am not for a moment forgetting or underestimating the tremendous events of 1917 and 1918 which eliminated Russia from the ranks of our allies at a crucial moment of the first World War, or the 16-year period of blackout between our two peoples, during which we withheld diplomatic recognition of each other's existence and suspended the normal contacts without which friendship cannot flourish.

¹ Delivered at a rally sponsored by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship in New York, N.Y., on Nov. 14, 1945.

But however great the loss to both our peoples from that gap in our relations, we need not regard it as irretrievable. Already a substantial part of it has been offset by our working partnership of World War II and the start toward peaceful cooperation that was made at the Moscow, Tehran, Crimea and San Francisco conferences, and by our joint membership in the United Nations Organization.

Taken as a whole, I repeat, the long record of common interest and common action is good. Can we put it down to chance? Can we ascribe it to all-wise governments or impeccable diplomacy? I don't think so. Forgetting governments and diplomats for the moment, let's look at more immutable facts of history and geography.

There is the fact, for example, that never, in the past, has there been any place on the globe where the vital interests of the American and Russian people have clashed or even been antagonistic—and there is no objective reason to suppose that there should, now or in the future, ever be such a place. There is an obvious reason for this. We are both continental peoples with adequate living space—interested in developing and enjoying the living space we have. Our ambition is to achieve the highest possible standards of living among our own peoples, and we have the wherewithal to achieve high standards of living without conquest, through peaceful development and trade.

We have that opportunity, moreover, only to the extent that we can create conditions of peace and prevent war. Thus the paramount interest, the only conceivable hope of both nations, lies in the cooperative enterprise of peace.

What, then, are the difficulties which lie across the path of this cooperative enterprise?

I believe the problem is capable of rational examination. I believe also that it is capable of solution. The hard core of the problem has two major aspects: first, the problem of security; and, second, the problem of understanding.

Both countries have been wantonly attacked. Both have suffered grievously, but differently. Both are determined that aggression shall have no such opportunity in the future.

The attack upon the Soviet Union came from just beyond her western borders. There was grave danger of attack from just beyond her eastern border. We can get some idea of the consequences of this attack—the second of its kind in a quarter of a century—if we imagine the United States

invaded by the German Wehrmacht, and an area roughly comparable to the New England and Middle Atlantic States almost completely devastated. If we imagine this area as including not only the industrial centers of New York, Boston, and Pittsburgh but a large part of the Middle Western bread basket and a third of our population as well, we can learn what aggression means to the Soviet people. We can understand also the measure of their determination to prevent it.

We understand and agree with them that to have friendly governments along her borders is essential both for the security of the Soviet Union and for the peace of the world. Secretary Byrnes made this clear beyond doubt in his speech of October thirty-first.

But it seems equally clear to us that the interest in security must take into account and respect other basic interests of nations and men, such as the interest of other peoples to choose the general surroundings of their own lives and of all men to be secure in their persons. We believe that that adjustment of interests should take place short of the point where persuasion and firmness become coercion, where a knock on the door at night strikes terror into men and women.

In this area where the room for adjustment is broad and where the necessity for extreme measures is absent, the problem seems wholly possible of friendly solution.

We, too, have our problem of security. The attack upon us came not from close at hand but from an aggressor, on two occasions, many thousands of miles away. The attacks were made upon a nation patently undesirous of and unprepared for war and solely because of our refusal supinely to acquiesce in conduct which outraged every sense of decency and right. This has led us to look for security through bases and methods which will keep danger far from us and stop the aggressor before he can again develop the power of his attack.

Our friends do not object to this but point out to us that we, too, must adjust our interest in security to the general interest in security and with the principles and organizations which have been agreed upon to insure it.

In the case of both the Soviet Union and ourselves the necessity to seek security by extreme measures or unilateral action is absent. Mr. Molotov has truly said:

"We have lived through difficult years and now each one of us can say: 'We have won and from now on we can consider our motherland rid from the menace of German invasion from the west and from the menace of Japanese invasion from the east.' The long awaited peace has come for the peoples of the whole world."

With the menaces to the security of both countries removed it would seem that there is both time and area within which to solve all questions arising out of the need of our two countries for security. The path to solution is both through the United Nations Organization, which we have joined in establishing, and in following in our dealings with other nations the principles upon which we have agreed in the Charter.

One of these is "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". Another is "to take . . . collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace".

These are principles of restraint and moderation and patience and respect for the dignity and integrity of nations and individuals. They furnish the best and surest foundations of friendship.

Then there is the second aspect of our problem of friendship—the second essential ingredient of friendship. I refer to the necessity for understanding and communication between the American and Soviet people.

Enduring friendship must be based on understanding and trust, not only between governments but between peoples. But we are faced with an immediate and practical question: How are we to know one another? Here are two peoples of strong convictions and different backgrounds. Each is committed to its way of life. Neither has the least desire to change the other. Yet each has an overwhelming desire to know and understand the other.

I confess I see no way to draw our peoples into closer understanding except by persistent efforts, on both sides, to free the lines of communication through the press and the radio, through books and magazines, through the exchange of knowledge and culture, and through travel and personal acquaintance. What we and the Soviet people need from each other and what we are entitled to ask was summed up by Marshal Stalin in a talk with Senator Pepper. "Just judge the Soviet Union objectively", said Marshal Stalin. "Do not

either praise us or scold us. Just know us and judge us as we are, and base your estimate of us upon facts and not rumors."

We have so much to learn and, what is more difficult, to understand about each other that we cannot hope to succeed except in the spacious atmosphere of honesty, candor, and knowledge. Only in that atmosphere can we keep our minds and emotions on an even keel and avoid the pitfalls of over-optimism on the one side and despair on the other. Both are equally dangerous and equally unjustified.

Protocol to Armistice Agreement with Finland

Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union

The Department has recently received from the American Embassy at Ottawa a copy of the text of a protocol between Canada, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. (Canada, Treaty Series, 1944, No. 29) to the armistice agreement signed by the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. with Finland on September 19, 1944.¹ The protocol, which was signed in Moscow on October 8, 1944, provides for the payment of a compensation to Canada for nickel mines at Petsamo. The protocol states that on the occasion of the signing of the armistice agreement with Finland, the three Governments are agreed that:

"In connection with the return by Finland to the Soviet Union of the former Soviet territory of the oblast of Petsamo (Pechenga) and the consequent transfer to ownership of the Soviet Union of nickel mines (including all property and installations appertaining thereto) operated in the said territory for the benefit of the Mond Nickel Company and the International Nickel Company of Canada, the Soviet Government will pay to the Government of Canada during the course of six years from the date of the signing of the present Protocol, in equal instalments, the sum of 20 million United States dollars as full and final compensation of the above mentioned companies. For the purpose of this payment United States dollars will be reckoned at the value of 35 dollars to one ounce of gold."

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1945, p. 261.

Situation of Jews in Europe

Statement by THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House November 13]

Following the receipt of information from various sources regarding the distressing situation of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution in Europe, I wrote to Mr. Attlee on August 31 bringing to his attention the suggestion in a report of Mr. Earl G. Harrison that the granting of an additional 100,000 certificates for the immigration of Jews into Palestine would alleviate the situation. A copy of my letter to Mr. Attlee is being made available to the press. I continue to adhere to the views expressed in that letter.

I was advised by the British Government that because of conditions in Palestine it was not in a position to adopt the policy recommended, but that it was deeply concerned with the situation of the Jews in Europe. During the course of subsequent discussions between the two Governments, it suggested the establishment of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, under a rotating chairmanship, to examine the whole question and to make a further review of the Palestine problem in the light of that examination and other relevant considerations.

In view of our intense interest in this matter and of our belief that such a committee will be of aid in finding a solution which will be both humane and just, we have acceded to the British suggestion.

The terms of reference of this committee as agreed upon between the two Governments are as follows:

1. To examine political, economic, and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.

2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by

their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.

3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for *ad-interim* handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.

4. To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe.

It will be observed that among the important duties of this committee will be the task of examining conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration. The establishment of this committee will make possible a prompt review of the unfortunate plight of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been subjected to persecution, and a prompt examination of questions related to the rate of current immigration into Palestine and the absorptive capacity of the country.

The situation faced by displaced Jews in Europe during the coming winter allows no delay in this matter. I hope the committee will be able to accomplish its important task with the greatest speed.

The text of the letter addressed to the Prime Minister of Great Britain by the President, under date of August 31, 1945, follows:

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

Because of the natural interest of this Government in the present condition and future fate of

those displaced persons in Germany who may prove to be stateless or non-repatriable, we recently sent Mr. Earl G. Harrison to inquire into the situation.

Mr. Harrison was formerly the United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, and is now the Representative of this Government on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. The United Kingdom and the United States, as you know, have taken an active interest in the work of this Committee.

Instructions were given to Mr. Harrison to inquire particularly into the problems and needs of the Jewish refugees among the displaced persons.

Mr. Harrison visited not only the American zone in Germany, but spent some time also in the British zone where he was extended every courtesy by the 21st Army Headquarters.

I have now received his report.¹ In view of our conversations at Potsdam I am sure that you will find certain portions of the report interesting. I am, therefore, sending you a copy.

I should like to call your attention to the conclusions and recommendations appearing on page 8 and the following pages—especially the references to Palestine. It appears that the available certificates for immigration to Palestine will be exhausted in the near future. It is suggested that the granting of an additional one hundred thousand of such certificates would contribute greatly to a sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria, and for other Jewish refugees who do not wish to remain where they are or who for understandable reasons do not desire to return to their countries of origin.

On the basis of this and other information which has come to me I concur in the belief that no other single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors of concentration camps for over a decade as is the future of immigration possibilities into Palestine. The number of such persons who wish immigration to Palestine or who would qualify for admission there is, unfortunately, no longer as large as it was before the Nazis began their extermination program. As I said to you in Potsdam, the American people, as a whole, firmly believe that immigration into Palestine

should not be closed and that a reasonable number of Europe's persecuted Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be permitted to resettle there.

I know you are in agreement on the proposition that future peace in Europe depends in large measure upon our finding sound solutions of problems confronting the displaced and formerly persecuted groups of people. No claim is more meritorious than that of the groups who for so many years have known persecution and enslavement.

The main solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-repatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine. If it is to be effective, such action should not be long delayed.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Bulgarian Elections

COMMUNICATION FROM U.S. POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE

[Released to the press November 16]

The United States Political Representative in Bulgaria, Maynard Barnes, has transmitted the following communication to the Bulgarian Government:

As the Bulgarian Government is aware the United States Government desires to conclude a treaty of peace with Bulgaria with the least possible delay and with that end in view has hoped to be able to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with an appropriate provisional Bulgarian Government at an early date. It is essential that such a Bulgarian Government be adequately representative of the important elements of democratic opinion and that arrangement be made for free elections in which all democratic elements of the country may effectively participate, free from the fear of force and intimidation, in order that the will of the majority of the people can be determined and the pledge given to them at Yalta be fulfilled.

The announced object of the recent visit of Mr. Mark Ethridge, the special representative of the Secretary of State, was in fact to investigate this situation. Mr. Ethridge's findings have been made known to the Bulgarian Government as well as to the signatories of the Yalta agreement.

Since the postponement of the elections origi-

¹ For text of Mr. Harrison's report to the President, see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 456.

nally scheduled for August 26, 1945, an opportunity has been given for freer political expression. However, no steps have been taken since August to reorganize the present Bulgarian Government to make it truly representative of democratic opinion. From the elections now scheduled for November 18, 1945, important democratic elements are excluded through the operation of a single list of candidates. Moreover, there are indications that the free expression of popular will is being further restricted by threats of coercion and later reprisals. There is no reason to believe the results of an election conducted under such conditions will reflect the Bulgarian peoples' choice of a representative democratic Government.

Greek Elections

PROVIDING FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE OBSERVATION OF ELECTIONS IN GREECE¹

[Released to the press by the White House November 17]

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Statutes, and as President and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. In accordance with the responsibilities undertaken by the United States at the Crimea Conference in February 1945 to assist the people in any European liberated state in securing the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people, and in response to the invitation extended to the United States and other Allied Governments by the Government of Greece, I appoint Henry F. Grady of California, effective as of October 25, 1945, as my representative to head the United States group which will participate with representatives of other Allied Governments in observing the forthcoming elections in Greece.

2. The Representative named herein is authorized to select and recommend to the President or to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of War necessary personnel to assist in the performance of his duties hereunder. The Secretary of State and

the Secretary of War are authorized to assist the Representative named herein in the performance of his duties hereunder, and to employ such personnel and make such expenditures, within the limits of appropriate appropriations now or hereafter available for the purpose, as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of this order, and the Secretary of War may make available, assign, or detail for duty with the Representative named herein such members of the military forces, not exceeding five hundred in number, and other personnel as may be requested for such purposes.

3. The Representative named herein shall have the personal rank of Ambassador and shall receive such compensation and allowance for expenses as may be authorized by the Secretary of State. Other necessary personnel employed to assist the Representative named herein in the performance of his duties shall likewise receive such compensation and allowance for expenses as may appropriately be authorized by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of War: *Provided, however*, That any personnel now in the employ of the Government shall serve without additional compensation but shall receive such allowance for expenses as may be authorized by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of War.

4. The Representative named herein is authorized to cooperate with, and receive the assistance of, any foreign Government to the extent deemed necessary by him to accomplish the purposes of this order.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,

November 16, 1945.

Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense

APPOINTMENT OF PIERRE DE L. BOAL AS U.S. MEMBER

[Released to the press November 13]

The President has approved the appointment of Pierre de L. Boal as the member designated by the United States on the inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense at Montevideo, Uruguay.²

¹ Ex. Or. 9857, 10 *Federal Register* 14243.

² For a discussion of the Committee, its establishment and organization, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1945, p. 3.

Foreign-Trade Reconstruction—

The Americas

Address by ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRADEN¹

[Released to the press November 14]

To address this thirty-second Foreign Trade Convention on some aspects of our economic relations with the other American republics is a privilege for which I am grateful. With such an informed and discerning audience it is unnecessary to go into details; therefore, in the limited time at my disposal I shall only touch upon a few of the more salient features of the subject.

Two weeks ago Secretary Byrnes, under this same roof, said: "We have learned by experience that to have good neighbors we must be a good neighbor."

We intend to follow that basic principle in the reconstruction period and thereafter, just as devotedly as we have during the war and in the preceding years. The American republics, with the notorious exception of one government, on balance have a splendid record of economic cooperation. They have been good neighbors.

The resources of the United States were inadequate to meet the insatiable demands of modern warfare. We needed many things—tin, rubber, petroleum, antimony, copper, food—and some of them we needed desperately.

To meet these deficiencies we turned to our southern neighbors. Because they had confidence in us and because from the very beginning we gave their civilian needs the same treatment as our own, they, for the most part, responded in a fine cooperative spirit. Thus Assistant Secretary Clayton at the Mexico City conference testified to the fact that the procurement contracts with the other American governments "were made without undue bargaining . . . [and] were on the whole performed with complete honesty and integrity; . . . the prices were fair", and "every effort was made to extend production".²

It is essential that our neighbors and we continue to solve our problems through consultation in an atmosphere of mutual respect and collaboration. There can be no dictation by either party

to the other. When differences arise, as they surely will, they must be settled by straight-forward negotiations, by compromise, by arbitration, and always with that friendly understanding which enables one to see the other's point of view.

In the reconstruction era that unanimity of purpose which prevails in wartime will be lacking, selfish interests will more readily come to the fore, and accommodations will be more difficult, as tempers already fatigued by war strains become increasingly harassed by the manifold and complicated problems which lie ahead for all.

The stern necessities of war have left to every country in this hemisphere a legacy of serious economic problems. Among these are the menace of inflation and exaggerated nationalisms, both of which are presently threatening on every side.

The United States has assumed a national debt of unprecedented and unparalleled size; we have dangerously accelerated the depletion of our strategic natural resources to a point where in some cases we are approaching the status of a "have not" nation; and we have distorted the shape of our economy by our all-out mobilization for war.

The gravity of our own economic position, however, must not blind us to the problems of our neighbors. Preoccupied as we are with the urgent tasks of creating a stable peacetime economy in the United States, we must not neglect those serious transitional problems which involve the economic relations of the American republics with one another.

Our war procurement of raw materials from the neighboring republics in some instances caused a great expansion in production facilities. The abrupt cancellation of our purchase contracts inevitably would cause wide-spread unemployment and economic distress. Yet we could not afford to continue to buy largely in excess of our needs.

This problem was recognized in resolution XXI at the Mexico City conference, which records general agreement with our view that international trade in these basic products and strategic materials should be returned to normal commercial channels so soon as possible. At the same time

¹ Delivered before the National Foreign Trade Convention in New York, N.Y., on Nov. 14, 1945.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 4, 1945, p. 334.

that resolution provides that suitable steps shall be taken during the readjustment period to minimize the adverse consequences of "cut-backs" on the economies of the countries concerned.

We are now in process of reducing our public purchases from Latin America. As we do so, we are adhering to the letter and spirit of our undertakings at Mexico City. Some commodities, of course, are still in short supply, and procurement continues at a high level. In other cases, where commodities have come or are coming into relatively easy supply, we have tried, where necessary, to ease the readjustment problem for the supplying country by arranging a gradual tapering-off of our purchases. We shall continue to give advance notice of our intentions. We have tried, within the limits of existing legislation, to curtail procurement equitably as between domestic and foreign sources, for we believe that high-cost procurement, wherever it be, should be curtailed before low-cost procurement, whether domestic or foreign. Moreover we have arranged in some instances to pay on a sliding scale in the cut-back period, in order to reduce the transitional shock to the supplying country. And finally, we are ready always to discuss these cut-back problems with the vendor countries, and to seek earnestly for equitable and mutually agreeable solutions.

The other American republics are normally heavily dependent on imports for their supplies of many types of manufactured goods, especially capital equipment of all varieties. Unhappily, the goods needed by our neighbors for the repair, improvement, and expansion of their economies were precisely the types most essential for prosecution of the war. Consequently, they sold to us during the war much more than we were able to sell to them, and now possess a large supply of dollars which they are eager to spend on imports. In view of the continuing shortage in the United States of many types of producers' goods, some of the other American nations are apprehensive that they may be unable to purchase a fair share of our output.

Lest there be misunderstanding on this score, I wish to emphasize that the United States Government rejects the view that the industrialization and diversification of the Latin American economies are threats to the maintenance of our own export markets in that area. The ancient mercantilist fallacy that an industrial exporting nation

should strive to impede the industrialization of its overseas markets was ridiculed and exploded nearly 200 years ago by Adam Smith; but, like many mistaken theories, this one dies hard.

The measure in which a customer nation may, through industrialization, increase its purchases is exemplified by the economic history of the United States. The early stages of our industrial development were largely financed by our foreign investors. There were those in England and elsewhere who warned against the export of capital to the United States, alleging that this profitable market for their manufactures would thereby be destroyed. Those were indeed false prophets; in the seventy years following the middle of the nineteenth century, our imports of finished manufactures increased six-fold.

Moreover, the industrialization of the United States so expanded our national income that large capital reserves accumulated domestically. In this way we were enabled not only to finance our further expansion but also to buy out much of the foreign holdings in the United States, thus without the slightest irritation accomplishing the repatriation of foreign investments on mutually beneficial terms.

Self-evidently, countries with low productivity have low living standards; life among the masses is a bitter struggle for rudimentary needs, and so the market for imports is narrow and limited. This axiom is witnessed in the significant fact that we normally export more goods to Canada, an industrialized nation, than to the whole of South America, although the latter has nearly ten times the population of the former.

Therefore, as a matter of ethics, as good neighbors and in order to increase our exports we are heartily in accord with the aspirations of our friends in this hemisphere for higher national productivity based on economic development and diversification. The people of the United States stand ready, as we have in the past, to assist to the extent we appropriately can in the formulation and execution of plans for the economically sound development of projects in the other American republics. I should be less than candid, however, if I failed to make clear that all of us should shun those plans for industrial development designed not to promote increased productivity and higher real national income but to serve the purposes of autarchy, neurotic nationalism, and military adventure. The pseudo-economic develop-

ment of the latter types would be wholly incompatible with the ideals of the inter-American system, and we should deplore the emergence of such policies.

Also it must be recognized that the sound industrialization of a country can by all odds be carried out more effectively under the dynamic system of private and, where possible, competitive enterprise, to which we are dedicated, than it ever can by government. Just as the United States and European capital both greatly benefited from the latter's investments here, so less developed nations who desire to advance the rate of their economic growth may profit by encouraging the entry of capital from abroad. It is perhaps pertinent to add that the huge burden of our public debt and the resultant taxes will bear heavily on the ability of the United States Government to extend itself financially in developing enterprises of this nature. This opportunity—I might even say responsibility—will perforce in large measure fall to the private investor.

The foreign investor has both rights and obligations. He reasonably expects that the former will be honored and that he will not be subjected to arbitrary and discriminatory acts. Money is a most timid thing and will venture only where there is stability and where commitments are being met. On the other hand, it is the obligation of the foreign investor and businessman rigidly to obey the laws of the country to which he goes, so to comport himself as always to create respect for his native land and never remotely to interfere in the internal political affairs of his hosts. Political meddling by foreign businessmen, or by anyone else, is both reprehensible and dangerous. Admittedly, unethical conduct on the part of a few of our businessmen has occurred in Latin America. But I am proud to say it has been by a small minority. The great majority of our merchants, bankers, and industrialists are of the highest integrity and will have no more truck with the other type than will our diplomatic missions. It is almost superfluous to add that the United States Government will not condone foreign political meddling by its nationals.

The industrialization programs of the other American republics must be considered from both a short- and a long-range point of view. In the present period, during which the demand for our output of producers' goods exceeds the supply, we are giving close and sympathetic attention to the

needs of our American neighbors. Many United States manufacturers of producers' goods, eager to reestablish their export trade, are voluntarily allocating a portion of their output to meet foreign demands. In cases of unusual urgency, we still possess the authority to give limited priority assistance to the orders of foreign buyers in certain cases. Moreover, we are anxious to bring Latin American buyers into contact with our manufacturers and, where necessary, to request our factories to allocate a portion of their output for export.

With these transitional problems solved, our neighbors and we shall then be face to face with working out the longer run economic relations of the Americas with each other and with the world. We shall be too late, however, if we wait to face their problems until they are upon us. Decisions are being made today and every day which will determine our economic relations tomorrow. As we make these decisions, all of the American nations should have clearly in mind the kind of economic system which will best serve our common ends.

We believe that the best suited system of economic relationships is the one most conducive to the preservation of peace and international understanding, and which is most effective in promoting higher living standards and increased prosperity here and throughout the Americas. The two, of course, are interdependent. Rising standards of living are a powerful bulwark to the institutions of freedom and popular government, and these institutions, as we now know too well, are stones in the arch of peace. The tyrant must first place his own people in chains before he is ready to leap at the throat of a neighbor.

With these ultimate objectives in mind, it is immediately clear that neither our neighbors nor we seek to establish a Western Hemisphere economic bloc. The American nations could, perhaps, organize an exclusive system of hemispheric trading arrangements, under which commerce between the Americas and the rest of the world would be discouraged or prevented.

What would that avail us? It would sanction the formation of other exclusive economic blocs. Economic blocs of this kind must inevitably become political blocs, the emergence of which would be an ominous warning that the peace of the world was in jeopardy.

Moreover, an exclusively hemispheric trading

system, far from promoting the economic well-being of the American republics, would undermine it. The United States, which normally takes about 30 percent of the Latin American export trade, would have to absorb nearly all of it. This is a manifest impossibility; either the United States market would be glutted with unwanted surpluses, or the other republics would suffer severely from the loss of their normal export markets. A protracted and painful period of readjustment would ensue, during which each of the American republics would have to transfer its productive energies from lines in which it was most efficient to others in which it would be less so. Productivity and standards of living would inevitably decline. These consequences would weaken, and eventually scuttle, the inter-American system.

The sole sane alternative to a hemispheric system of discrimination and restriction is an international system of equal treatment and expansion. It is only in a world economy constructed along these lines that each nation, in the Americas and elsewhere, can realize the highest potential of its productive powers; nor is there any other basic pattern for world economic organization which produces fewer of the economic practices which engender international friction and hostility.

The achievement of these goals demands, on the part of all like-minded nations, a concerted effort to eliminate every form of economic discrimination, including preferences, multi-column tariffs, and discriminatory exchange and quota practices; to reduce substantially the tariff barriers which have throttled the trade of the world; to put an end to the restrictive practices of international cartels; to adopt a code of principles to govern the use of subsidies, commodity agreements, and other such devices; and to proscribe the use of tactics of economic aggression.

It is fitting to consider this ideal of world economic organization against the background of the interests and aspirations of the other republics of this hemisphere.

Until the economic cataclysms of the early 1930's, there were few areas in the world which adhered more closely than Latin America to the basic principles of the liberal international trading system. The other American republics found, in the first three decades of this century, that their economic interests were best served by a high degree of integration with the world economy, by

the avoidance of discrimination and of other trade barriers. These principles remain as valid for Latin America today as they were in the 1920's, since the prosperity of many of the other American republics is almost directly determined by the level and composition of their foreign trade.

The Latin American countries were forced to deviate from these principles, not by any fundamental change in their interests but because they were driven in desperation to seek to isolate themselves from the economic disaster which swept across the world in the early 1930's. The prices of the goods exported by the other American nations fell far more than the prices of the goods they imported; their export markets disappeared; the stability of their currencies was threatened; tariffs were raised against them; European nations adopted policies of discrimination and bilateralism.

Once the other American republics were driven to adopt defensive tactics, they logically had to learn and follow techniques of restrictionism and discrimination. Latin American trade soon became a jungle of rising and multi-column tariffs, of quotas and clearing agreements, of barter, exchange control, and multiple currency systems. The virus of economic nationalism soon spread to fields of activity only remotely related to the root cause of the trouble. Some countries, for example, severely restricted the freedom of foreign nationals to practice their trades and professions. In this respect, however, the United States is in no position to be critical, since many of our States enforce similar unwise and counter-productive restrictions.

We have no desire to engage in recriminations over the economic history of the 1930's; our own record, let it be remembered, was far from being free of blemishes. Our own Hawley-Smoot tariff was one of the first economic provocations. However, it is equally true that we were one of the first to see the error of our ways and to try to call a halt to the blind series of negative defensive measures, retaliations, and counter-retaliations. We may be proud that one of the few notes of sanity in that destructive decade was struck by our own reciprocal trade-agreements program, which embodied the wisdom and patience of that great statesman, Cordell Hull. But our trade-agreements program came too late, with Hitler already in power and world conflict already in the making, to do more than eliminate some of the more conspicuous economic excesses of that unhappy period.

It is to be hoped that we have learned a lesson and will put it into practice. We start today not with a clean slate but with a slate cleaner than it may be again for a very long time. The world, chastened and sobered by six years of total war, should be as ready now as it ever will be in our lifetimes to adopt fundamental remedies to the economic ills that beset us.

With these thoughts in mind, we have drawn up, in cooperation with our neighbors of this hemisphere and with the other members of the United Nations, a plan for the solution of the problems posed by the exchange restrictions and discriminations and the competitive currency devaluations of the 1930's. In the Bretton Woods plan for an International Monetary Fund, we have agreed upon a code of fair practices to govern the operation of the international exchanges, and we have established a fund to tide members over transitional difficulties and help make it possible for them to adhere to the code of rules. The International Bank, plans for which were also formulated at Bretton Woods, should assist in promoting loans to finance sound projects for reconstruction and economic development.

The Congress of the United States has already approved our participation in the Bretton Woods institutions. We should be disappointed to see the Fund and the Bank established without the participation from the very beginning of all of the eligible nations of this hemisphere.

We are looking forward to a United Nations conference on trade and employment in 1946—a conference which will, we hope, accomplish for the problems of world trade and employment what the Bretton Woods conference achieved for the problems of international financial and exchange relationships. It is our hope that the other American republics will join with us at that conference in the formulation of an economic treaty of peace which may break the shackles which now confine the trade of the world.

No area will benefit more than the Americas from the reconstruction of world trade along liberal, non-discriminatory lines; no peoples have a greater stake in the rehabilitation of the world economy than do the peoples of all the American republics.

We want to see the Americas, then, not as an economic bloc but as an integral part of an economic whole. We desire this because of, and not in spite of, our special security interests in the

Western Hemisphere; for we know of no way better to protect this hemisphere and ourselves than by helping to promote the prosperity, stability, and mutual trust and confidence of the Americas.

We ask no special rights or privileges from our neighbors, nor do we ask them to discriminate against non-American nations. We could not, of course, sit idly by while a non-American nation tried, as did the Nazis, to use its economic relations with the Americas as a cover for political intrigue and provocation; but we seek to bar from this hemisphere no nation which desires, in good faith, to engage in commerce with it.

The economic integration of the Americas with the rest of the world is not a development which we fear; on the contrary, we desire it, and we will gladly do our utmost to achieve it.

Either the exaggerated nationalisms, now so prevalent everywhere, must be completely extirpated from relations between peoples, or those nationalisms will prevent reconstruction, destroy trade and investment, lower living standards, and again imperil civilization.

To eliminate those nationalisms and substitute therefor constructive practical cooperation, as good neighbors, in benefit of all concerned is our firm purpose.

The countless obstacles including the grave threats of inflation which may appear to block the reconstruction of foreign trade in this hemisphere can be overcome—and with surprising rapidity—if each of the American governments together with our respective citizens will give honesty and thought, hard work and cooperation to the task. With these homely ingredients, the unbelievable in prosperity can be accomplished.

Fourth Inter-American Press Conference

[Released to the press November 16]

The Department of State has been informed by the American Embassy at Bogotá of the formation of an organizing committee for the Fourth Inter-American Press Conference, which is scheduled to convene at Bogotá in the early part of 1946. The communication from the Embassy states that if any members of the United States press desire to attend this Conference they should address their correspondence to the committee through the Colombian foreign office.

The Educational, Scientific and Cultural

THE CONFERENCE on the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization of the United Nations opened in London on November 1, 1945.

The first session was called to order at 10:30 a. m. by Prof. Alf Sommerfeldt, Chairman of the Working Committee. A Credentials Committee was appointed which found the credentials of all delegates to be in good order. Rules of procedure were adopted.

It was decided that the meetings of the Conference, its commissions, and its committees shall be public unless the body concerned decides otherwise. Decisions of the Conference reached at a private meeting must be announced at an early public meeting of the Conference. At the suggestion of Mr. Archibald MacLeish, Chairman of the United States Delegation, this rule is interpreted as applying also to committees.

Miss Ellen Wilkinson, Minister of Education for England and Wales and British Delegate to the Conference, was elected President of the Conference on the motion of Mr. Leon Blum, seconded by Mr. MacLeish.

Mr. Leon Blum, former Premier of France and President of the French Delegation, was elected Associate President. The following were elected Vice Presidents: the chairmen of delegations from China, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, India, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Union of South Africa, United States of America.

The Conference was addressed by the Right Honorable Clement R. Attlee, Prime Minister of Great Britain, by Miss Wilkinson, and Mr. Blum.

It was agreed to establish five commissions.

A resolution was received from the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education urging acceleration of the work of educational and cultural reconstruction in the liberated countries.

¹ Prepared in London for the Division of Public Liaison by Herbert J. Abraham. Dr. Abraham is Information and Liaison officer in the Group Relations Branch in the Division of Public Liaison, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State.

REPORT ON THE

A second resolution from the same body recommended that the plans for the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization provide for periodic meetings of the Ministers of Education of the United Nations. The resolution was referred to Commission II.

The first series of plenary sessions ended on November 5, 1945. By that time the delegates from all the countries represented had addressed the Conference. Throughout the week of November 5, 1945 the Conference worked in five commissions. Each commission consists of a delegate from each participating country who may be accompanied by advisers. Each commission considers an assigned topic; the assignments are as follows:

COMMISSION I. *Preamble, purposes and functions.* Officers of this Commission are: Chairman, Dr. R. C. Wallace, Canada; Vice Chairman, Dr. Bolkstein, Netherlands; United States Delegate, Archibald MacLeish; United States Advisers, Messrs. Leland, Meiklejohn, Schlagle, Miss Elliott; United States Technical Expert, Mr. Thomson.

COMMISSION II. *Membership and structure of the organization, including the general conference.* Officers of this Commission are: Chairman, Prof. Alf Sommerfeldt, Norway; Vice Chairman, Dr. E. R. Walker, Australia; United States Delegate, Mr. Stoddard; United States Advisers, Messrs. Emmerich, Kefauver, Starr; United States Technical Experts, Messrs. Benjamin, Biddle.

COMMISSION III. *The Executive Board and Secretariat.* Officers of this Commission are: Chairman, M. de Visscher, Belgium; Vice Chairman, Mr. A. E. Campbell, New Zealand; United States Delegates, Messrs. Merrow, Benton; United States Advisers, Messrs. Evans, Shuster; United States Technical Experts, Messrs. Kotschnig, Stone.

COMMISSION IV. *Relations with other international organizations and the location of the organization.* Officers of this Commission are: Chair-

Organization of the United Nations

ON LONDON CONFERENCE¹

man, Dr. Jean Opocensky, Czechoslovakia; Vice Chairman, Mr. Walker Linares, Chile; United States Delegate, Senator Murray; United States Advisers, Messrs. Emmerich, Leland, Gerig, Schlagle; United States Technical Experts, Mrs. Brunauer, Mr. Stone.

COMMISSION V. *The Interim Commission, which will make preparations for the first meeting of the organization.* Officers of this Commission are: Chairman, Lt. Col. L. Marquart, Union of South Africa; Vice Chairman, Mr. Hasan Ali Yucel, Turkey; United States Delegates, Dean Thompson, Mr. Shapley; United States Advisers, Messrs. Kefauver, Shuster, Crowley; United States Technical Expert, Mr. Holland.

Decisions made at the commissions are harmonized and given final formulation by the Drafting Committee. When the commissions have concluded their work the Conference will meet in plenary session to approve the constitution.²

All meetings of the commissions have been open to the public and to the press.

The commissions are moving rapidly. Present plans call for submission of commission reports by the night of Tuesday, November 13, 1945. Agreements have been reached on many questions. The name of the organization will be *The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*. The organization will have three main organs: the Conference, the Executive Board, and the Secretariat.

Substantial agreement has been reached on the text for the preamble, purposes, and functions of the organization and it is now in the hands of a drafting subcommittee. The statement of functions will provide against interference by the organization in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Commission II has decided that members of the United Nations shall automatically be granted the right of membership in UNESCO. Other nations may

be admitted subject to the conditions of the agreement to be negotiated with the United Nations Organization. The article on membership as approved omits any reference to withdrawal. The Commission decided that the provision on this subject contained in the draft proposals was unworkable and was also unnecessary since the right of withdrawal may be presumed. The Conference will consist of the representatives of the members of the organization. The government of each member state will appoint not more than five delegates, who are to be selected after consultation with educational and cultural bodies or a national commission.

Article VIII-A dealing with the composition of national commissions will read as follows subject to revision by the Drafting Committee:³

"Each member state shall make arrangements preferably by the formation of a national commission on educational, scientific and cultural cooperation, broadly representative of the government; and the principal groups devoted to educational, scientific and cultural matters for the purpose of associating bodies of educational, scientific and cultural opinion with the work of the organization."

The functions and powers of the Conference are those listed in the draft proposals plus explicit provision for international conventions. Each member will have one vote.

Commission III has decided that the Executive Board will consist of 18 members holding office for 3 years, 6 to be elected each year. They are to be selected from among the delegates to the Conference, and the tenure of office is contingent upon their continuing to be delegates. In electing the members of the Executive Board, the Conference must endeavor to assure an equitable distribution of persons competent in the arts, humanities, sciences, technology, education, and diffusion of

² For text of the draft constitution and an interpretation see BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1945, p. 165.

³ For revised text see art. VII of the Final Act, p. 805.

ideas. Under these provisions qualified persons in these fields rather than representatives of states would compose the Executive Board.

The President of the Conference will be *ex officio* a member of the Executive Board with consultative functions only. The Commission has rejected proposals which tended to give the Chairman of the Board powers overlapping those of the Director General. The Board is not given the power to supervise the administration of the organization. The Director General will submit his annual report to the Board for comment and will transmit it directly to the Conference.

Paris has been selected as the seat of the organization. This question, although not provided for in the draft proposals, was placed on the agenda and has been a main subject of discussion.

Commission IV met for the first time Thursday, November 8, 1945. The following text for article XIV, paragraphs 1 and 2, submitted by the United States, was approved as clarified by the Drafting Committee:¹

"This organization may cooperate with other specialized intergovernmental organizations or agencies whose interests and activities are related to its purposes. To this end the Director General, acting under the general authority of the Executive Board, may establish effective working relationships with such other organizations and agencies and establish such joint committees as may be necessary to assure effective cooperation. Any formal arrangements entered into with such organizations and agencies shall be subject to the approval of the Executive Board."

A new article temporarily designated as "XIV-A" has been added as follows:²

"The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization may make suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental international organizations concerned with matters within its competence and may invite them to undertake certain specific tasks. Such cooperation may also include appropriate participation by representatives of such organi-

zation on advisory committees set up by the conference."

An important issue has arisen in Commission V concerning the functions of the Interim Commission. There was strong pressure to authorize the Interim Commission to take action with respect to the educational rehabilitation of liberated countries. The formula finally agreed upon which constitutes paragraph 6 of the agreement on interim arrangements follows:

"The commission shall appoint a special technical subcommittee to examine the problems relating to the educational, scientific and cultural needs of the countries devastated by the war, having regard to the information already collected and the work being done by other international organizations, and to prepare as complete a conspectus as possible of the extent and nature of the problems for the information of the organization at its first conference.

"When the technical subcommittees are satisfied that any ameliorative measures are immediately practicable to meet any educational, scientific or cultural needs, they shall report to the Preparatory Commission accordingly and the Commission shall, if they approve, take steps to bring such needs to the attention of governments, organizations and persons wishing to assist by contributing money, supplies or services in order that coordinated relief may be given either directly by the donors to the countries requiring aid or indirectly through existing international relief organizations."

In addition to the questions of location and of educational rehabilitation, the question of relationship with other international organizations aroused much discussion. France has withdrawn her recommendation that the existing International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation constitute the Secretariat of the organization. France proposed that some international associations be given membership in the organization. Sentiment in the Conference, however, emphasized that UNESCO is an organization of governments, and this consideration has prevailed in a number of questions.

¹ See art. XI of the Final Act, p. 805.

² *Ibid.*

[Rele
TI
Edu
of th
ernm
with
were
tion
the r
ters
out i
the U
don i
Th
were
and A
Argen
Austra
Belgiu
Bolivi
Brazil
Canad
Chile
China
Colomb
Cuba
Czecho
Denma
Domin
Ecuado
El Salv
Egypt
France
Greece
Guatem
Haiti
India
Iran
Iraq
Leban
The
also re

FINAL ACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION¹

[Released to the press November 17]

The Conference for the Establishment of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization of the United Nations was convened by the Government of the United Kingdom in association with the Government of France. The invitations were sent out in accordance with the recommendation of the Conference of San Francisco and upon the request of the Conference of the Allied Ministers of Education in order to promote the aims set out in Article 1, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations. The Conference met in London from the 1st to the 16th of November, 1945.

The Governments of the following countries were represented at the Conference by Delegates and Advisors:

Argentine Republic	Liberia
Australia	Luxembourg
Belgium	Mexico
Bolivia	The Netherlands
Brazil	New Zealand
Canada	Nicaragua
Chile	Norway
China	Panama
Colombia	Peru
Cuba	The Philippines
Czechoslovakia	Poland
Denmark	Saudi Arabia
Dominican Republic	Syria
Ecuador	Turkey
El Salvador	Union of South Africa
Egypt	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
France	United States of America
Greece	Uruguay
Guatemala	Venezuela (represented by an observer)
Haiti	Yugoslavia
India	
Iran	
Iraq	
Lebanon	

The following international organizations were also represented by observers:

International Labor Organization
League of Nations Secretariat
League of Nations Committee on Intellectual Cooperation
International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation
Pan American Union
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
International Bureau of Education

The Conference had before it and adopted as its basis of discussion a draft Constitution prepared by the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education. It likewise had before it a draft Constitution prepared by the French Government. A number of proposals put forward by other governments and by various bodies and organizations were also before the Conference. After consideration of these drafts and proposals the Conference drew up a Constitution Establishing an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and an Instrument Establishing a Preparatory Educational, Scientific and Cultural Commission. The Conference also adopted the following Resolution:

"The seat of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization shall be in Paris. This Resolution shall not in any way affect the right of the General Conference to take decisions in regard to this matter by a two-thirds majority."

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed this Final Act.² Done in London the sixteenth day of November 1945 in a single copy in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic. This copy shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United Kingdom by whom certified copies will be sent to all the United Nations.

¹ Telegraphic text, incorporating substantive changes received at a later date.

² Signatures not transmitted with telegraphic text.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

PREAMBLE

The Governments of the States parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare

that since wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed; that ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause throughout the history of mankind of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war; that the great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men and by the propagation in their place through ignorance and prejudice of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races; that the wide diffusion of culture and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern; that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of Governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world and that the peace must, therefore, be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind. *For these reasons* the States parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives; *In consequence whereof* they do hereby create the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims.

ARTICLE I

Purposes and Functions

1. The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world without distinction of race, sex, language or religion by the Charter of the United Nations.

2. To realize this purpose the organization will

(a) Collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image.

(b) Give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture by collaborating with members at their request in the development of educational activities, by instituting collaboration among the nations to advance the ideal of equality of educational opportunity without regard to race, sex or any distinctions economic or social by suggesting educational methods best suited to prepare the children of the world for the responsibilities of freedom.

(c) Maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge by assuring the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions; by encouraging cooperation among the nations in all branches of intellectual activity, including the international exchange of persons active in the fields of education, science and culture and the exchange of publications, objects of artistic and scientific interest and other materials of information; by initiating methods of international cooperation calculated to give the people of all countries access to the printed and published materials produced by any of them.

3. With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States members of this Organization, the Organization is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.

ARTICLE II

Membership

1. Membership of the United Nations Organization shall carry with it the right to membership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

2. Subject to the conditions of the agreement between this Organization and the United Nations Organization, approved pursuant to Article X of this Constitution, States not members of the United Nations Organization may be admitted to membership of the Organization upon recommendation of the Executive Board by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference.

3. Members of the Organization which are suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership of the United Nations Organization shall, upon the request of the latter, be suspended from the rights and privileges of this Organization.

4. Members of the Organization which are expelled from the United Nations Organization shall automatically cease to be members of this Organization.

ARTICLE III

Organs

The Organization shall include a General Conference, an Executive Board and a Secretariat.

ARTICLE IV

The General Conference

A. COMPOSITION

1. The General Conference shall consist of the representatives of the States members of the Organization. The Government of each Member State shall appoint not more than five delegates who shall be selected after consultation with the National Commission if established, or with educational, scientific and cultural bodies.

B. FUNCTIONS

2. The General Conference shall determine the policies and the main lines of work of the Organization. It shall take decisions on programs drawn up by the Executive Board.

3. The General Conference shall when it deems it desirable, summon international conferences on education, the sciences and humanities and the dissemination of knowledge.

4. The General Conference shall in adopting proposals for submission to the Member States, distinguish between recommendations and international conventions submitted for their approval. In the former case a majority vote shall suffice, in the latter case a two-thirds majority shall be required. Each of the Member States shall submit recommendations or conventions to its competent authorities within a period of one year from the close of the session of the General Conference at which they were adopted.

5. The General Conference shall advise the United Nations Organization on the educational, scientific and cultural aspects of matters of concern to the latter in accordance with the terms and procedure agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two organizations.

6. The General Conference shall receive and consider the reports submitted periodically by Member States as provided by Article VIII.

7. The General Conference shall elect the members of the Executive Board and on the recommendation of the Board shall appoint the Director-General.

C. VOTING

8. Each Member State shall have one vote in the General Conference. Decisions shall be made by a simple majority, except in cases in which a two-thirds majority is required by the provisions of this constitution. A majority shall be a majority of the members present and voting.

D. PROCEDURE

9. The General Conference shall meet annually in ordinary session. It may meet in extraordinary session on the call of the Executive Board. At each session the location of its next session shall be designated by the General Conference and shall vary from year to year.

10. The General Conference shall at each session elect a President and other officers and adopt Rules of Procedure.

11. The General Conference shall set up special and technical committees and such other subordinate bodies as may be necessary for its purposes.

12. The General Conference shall cause arrangements to be made for public access to meetings subject to such regulations as it shall prescribe.

E. OBSERVERS

13. The General Conference on the recommendation of the Executive Board and by a two-

thirds majority may subject to its rules of procedure invite as observers at specified sessions of the conference or of its commissions representatives of international organizations such as those referred to in Article XI, Paragraph 4.

ARTICLE V

Executive Board

A. COMPOSITION

1. The Executive Board shall consist of eighteen members elected by the General Conference from among the Delegates appointed by the Member States together with the President of the Conference who shall sit *ex officio* in an advisory capacity.

2. In electing the members of the Executive Board the General Conference shall endeavor to include persons competent in the arts, the humanities, the sciences, education and the diffusion of ideas and qualified by their experiences and capacity to fulfill the administrative and executive duties of the Board. It shall also have regard to the diversity of cultures and a balanced geographical distribution. Not more than one national of any Member State shall serve on the Board at any one time, the President of the Conference excepted.

3. The elected members of the Executive Board shall serve for a term of three years and shall be immediately eligible for a second term but shall not serve consecutively for more than two terms. At the first election eighteen members shall be elected of whom one-third shall retire at the end of the first year and one-third at the end of the second year, the order of retirement being determined immediately after the election by the drawing of lots. Thereafter six members shall be elected each year.

4. In the event of the death or resignation of one of its members the Executive Board shall appoint from among the Delegates of the Member State concerned a substitute who shall serve until the next session of the General Conference which shall elect a member for the remainder of the term.

B. FUNCTIONS

5. The Executive Board, acting under the authority of the General Conference, shall be responsible for the execution of the program adopted by the Conference and shall prepare its agenda and program of work.

6. The Executive Board shall recommend to the General Conference the admission of new Members to the Organization.

7. Subject to decisions of the General Conference the Executive Board shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure. It shall elect its officers from among its Members.

8. The Executive Board shall meet in regular session at least twice a year and may meet in special session if convoked by the Chairman on his own initiative or upon the request of six Members of the Board.

9. The Chairman of the Executive Board shall present to the General Conference with or without comment the annual report of the Director-General on the activities of the Organization which shall have been previously submitted to the Board.

10. The Executive Board shall make all necessary arrangements to consult the representatives of international organizations or qualified persons concerned with questions within its competence.

11. The Members of the Executive Board shall exercise the powers delegated to them by the General Conference on behalf of the Conference as a whole and not as representatives of their respective governments.

ARTICLE VI

Secretariat

1. The Secretariat shall consist of a Director-General and such staff as may be required.

2. The Director-General shall be nominated by the Executive Board and appointed by the General Conference for a period of six years under such conditions as the conference may approve and shall be eligible for reappointment. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the organization.

3. The Director-General or a deputy designated by him shall participate without the right to vote in all meetings of the General Conference, of the Executive Board and of the Committees of the Organization. He shall formulate proposals for appropriate action by the Conference and the Board.

4. The Director-General shall appoint the Staff of the Secretariat in accordance with staff regulations to be approved by the General Conference. Subject to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of integrity, efficiency and technical competence appointment to the staff shall be on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

5. The responsibilities of the Director-General and of the Staff shall be exclusively international in character. In the discharge of their duties they shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might prejudice their position as international officials. Each State Member of the Organization undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General and the Staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

6. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the Organization from entering into special arrangements within the United Nations Organization for common services and Staff and for the interchange of personnel.

ARTICLE VII

National Cooperating Bodies

1. Each Member State shall make such arrangements as suit its particular conditions for the purpose of associating its principal bodies interested in educational, scientific and cultural matters with the work of Organization, preferably by the formation of a National Commission broadly representative of the Government and such bodies.

2. National Commissions or national cooperating bodies where they exist, shall act in an advisory capacity to their respective Delegations to the General Conference and to their Governments in matters relating to the Organization and shall function as agencies of liaison in all matters of interest to it.

3. The Organization may on the request of a Member State delegate either temporarily or permanently a Member of its Secretariat to serve on the National Commission of that State in order to assist in the development of its work.

ARTICLE VIII

Reports by Member States

Each Member State shall report periodically to the Organization in a manner to be determined by the General Conference on its laws, regulations and statistics relating to educational, scientific and cultural life and institutions and on the action taken upon the recommendations and conventions referred to in Article IV, Paragraph 4.

ARTICLE IX

Budget

1. The Budget shall be administered by the Organization.

2. The General Conference shall approve and give final effect to the Budget and to the apportionment of financial responsibility among the States Members of the Organization subject to such arrangement with the United Nations as may be provided in the agreement to be entered into pursuant to Article X.

3. The Director-General with the approval of the Executive Board may receive gifts, bequests and subventions directly from Governments' public and private institutions, associations and private persons.

ARTICLE X

Relations with the United Nations Organization

This Organization shall be brought into relation with the United Nations Organization as soon as practicable as one of the specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations. This relationship shall be effected through an agreement with the United Nations Organization under Article 63 of the Charter which agreement shall be subject to the approval of the General Conference of this Organization. The agreement shall provide for effective cooperation between the two Organizations in the pursuit of their common purposes and at the same time shall recognize the autonomy of this Organization within the fields of its competence as defined in this Constitution. Such agreement may, among other matters, provide for the approval and financing of the Budget of the Organization by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XI

Relations with Other Specialized International Organizations and Agencies

1. This Organization may cooperate with other specialized inter-governmental organizations and agencies whose interests and activities are related to its purposes. To this end the Director-General, acting under the general authority of the Executive Board, may establish effective working relationships with such Organizations and agencies

and establish such joint Committees as may be necessary to assure effective cooperation. Any formal arrangements entered into with such Organizations or agencies shall be subject to the approval of the Executive Board.

2. Whenever the General Conference of this Organization and the competent authorities of any other specialized inter-governmental organizations or agencies whose purposes and functions lie within the competence of this Organization deem it desirable to effect a transfer of their resources and activities to this Organization the Director-General, subject to the approval of the Conference, may enter into mutually acceptable arrangements for this purpose.

3. This Organization may make appropriate arrangements with other inter-governmental organizations for reciprocal representation at meetings.

4. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization may make suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental international organizations concerned with matters within its competence and may invite them to undertake specific tasks. Such cooperation may also include appropriate participation by representatives of such organizations on Advisory Committees set up by the General Conference.

ARTICLE XII

Legal Status of the Organization

The provisions of Article 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization concerning the legal status of that Organization, its privileges and immunities shall apply in the same way to this Organization.

ARTICLE XIII

Amendments

1. Proposals for amendments to this Constitution shall become effective upon receiving the approval of the General Conference by a two-thirds majority provided, however, that those amendments which involve fundamental alterations in the aims of the Organization or new obligations for the Member States shall require subsequent acceptance on the part of two-thirds of the Member States before they come into force. The draft texts of proposed amendments shall be commu-

nicated by the Director-General to the Member States at least six months in advance of their consideration by the General Conference.

2. The General Conference shall have power to adopt by a two-thirds majority Rules of Procedure for carrying out the provisions of this Article.

ARTICLE XIV

Interpretation

1. The English and French texts of this Constitution shall be regarded as equally authoritative.

2. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation of this Constitution shall be referred for determination to the International Court of Justice or to an Arbitral Tribunal as the General Conference may determine under its Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE XV

Entry into Force

1. This Constitution shall be subject to acceptance. The Instruments of Acceptance shall be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom.

2. This Constitution shall remain open for signature in the Archives of the Government of the United Kingdom. Signature may take place either before or after the deposit of the Instrument of Acceptance. No acceptance shall be valid unless preceded or followed by signature.

3. This Constitution shall come into force when it has been accepted by twenty of its signatories. Subsequent acceptances shall take effect immediately.

4. The Government of the United Kingdom will inform all members of the United Nations of the receipt of all Instruments of Acceptance and of the date on which the Constitution comes into force in accordance with the preceding paragraph.

In faith whereof the undersigned duly authorized to that effect, have signed this constitution in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in London the sixteenth day of November 1945 in a single copy, in the English and French languages, of which certified copies will be communicated by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Governments of all the Members of the United Nations.

United States Participation in UNRRA

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS¹

[Released to the press by the White House November 13]

To the Congress of the United States of America:

This country has pledged itself to do all that is reasonably possible to alleviate the suffering of our war-torn allies and to help them begin the task of restoring their economic productivity. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration is one of the most important instrumentalities for accomplishing this great task.

As I stated in my message to the Congress on September 6, 1945, the forty-seven nations of the Council of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration determined at their Third Meeting in London last August that contributions beyond those originally made would be necessary if we expect to complete the minimum tasks assigned to UNRRA. The Council recommended, on the motion of the United States Delegate, that each member country, whose territory had not been invaded by the enemy, should contribute an additional amount equal to one percent of its national income for the fiscal year 1943.

In accordance with this recommendation, the United States share would be \$1,350,000,000, matching our original contribution authorized by the Act of Congress of March 28, 1944.

The original contributions of all the member nations have been applied principally to the activities of UNRRA in providing relief and rehabilitation assistance to the countries of eastern and southeastern Europe, and to the care of United Nations displaced persons stranded in enemy territory. UNRRA, of course, does not undertake relief or rehabilitation responsibilities in either Germany or Japan.

The invaded countries of northwest Europe, comprising France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway, by and large, possess sufficient resources in foreign currency and credit to acquire their own essential imports from abroad. Direct assistance to northwest Europe is, therefore, not being furnished by UNRRA.

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania, on the other hand, not only have suffered greatly at the hands of the enemy in the course of the war but they are almost entirely without foreign exchange or credit resources. Consequently to date they have been the chief objects of UNRRA's activity.

UNRRA has undertaken a limited program of \$50,000,000 in Italy to provide for the health and care of children, and expectant or nursing mothers.

Italy, since her participation in the war as a co-belligerent with the United Nations, has contributed substantially in both manpower and facilities to the Allied victory, becoming, at the same time, one of the most severely contested battlefields of the war. The destitution and needs there are appalling. Italy has virtually no foreign exchange resources and without the aid of UNRRA the country might well lapse into starvation.

UNRRA has also assisted in the care and repatriation of millions of allied victims of Axis aggression who were deported to and enslaved in Germany. It has initiated a preliminary program of assistance to China.

By the end of this year UNRRA anticipates that all the funds which will be made available to it from all sources in accordance with the original contributions will have been spent or encumbered. The flow of supplies purchased with these funds cannot last beyond the early spring.

The end of the war with Japan has made it possible to estimate the magnitude of the relief requirements of China and other Far Eastern areas. Reports on the European harvest of 1945 reveal a serious shortage of all types of foodstuffs.

China presents the largest of all the relief responsibilities which UNRRA now faces. With inadequate supplies and resources it has struggled bravely for eight years to combat the enemy as well as the ravages of famine, disease and inflation. Other programs are required for Korea and Formosa, two areas of the Far East which are now being restored to the peaceful ranks of the

¹ H. Doc. 378, 79th Cong., 1st sess.

United Nations after decades of Japanese oppression and extortion.

UNRRA proposes the extension of aid to Austria. This proposal is in accordance with the Moscow and Potsdam declarations by the major powers to the effect that Austria should be treated independently of Germany and encouraged to resume the free and peaceful role which it played before being invaded by Hitler's legions.

A limited program of aid is also intended for the Soviet Republics of White Russia and the Ukraine. These areas constituted the principal battlefields in the struggle between Russia and Germany. They were the scene of some of the worst German atrocities, devastation, and pillage.

The recommended additional contributions will hardly suffice to permit UNRRA to meet the most urgent and immediate needs for relief and rehabilitation for which it is responsible. We hope to fulfill a substantial part of this contribution through the use of military and lend-lease supplies which have become surplus since the surrender of our enemies.

I know that America will not remain indifferent to the call of human suffering. This is particularly true when it is suffering on the part of those who by sacrifice and courage kept the enemy from realizing the fruits of his early victories and from bringing his military might to bear upon our own shores.

UNRRA is the chosen instrument of forty-seven United Nations to meet the immediate relief and rehabilitation needs of the invaded countries.

UNRRA is the first of the international organizations to operate in the post-war period, one which the United States originally sponsored and in which it has played a leading part. Apart from purely humanitarian considerations, its success will do much to prove the possibility of establishing order and cooperation in a world finally at peace.

I, therefore, request the Congress to authorize a new appropriation of \$1,350,000,000 for participation in the activities of UNRRA.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 13, 1945.

¹ Made on Nov. 16, 1945 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in connection with a bill making further authorizations for UNRRA.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY ACHESON¹

[Released to the press November 16]

Just two years ago 44 nations signed the UNRRA agreement and created the first of the United Nations organizations. I think it is pertinent to remember that in the middle of a war we and our Allies began to plan for relief and rehabilitation.

Today the United Nations is more than a tentative association of Allies concerned with the planning of relief assistance. It is a political reality. It seems to us natural and normal that we should play our part in that association and join with other countries in the handling of our common problems.

There is some danger that we will forget what an enormous change has occurred in our thinking and take for granted the techniques we have perfected to work together in peace as well as in war.

UNRRA is not just another agency which we can alter or discard to suit some temporary convenience, for it has become one of the foundation blocks of our whole effort to secure a functioning international organization.

There have been three meetings of the UNRRA Council. At each meeting there were differences of opinion. At each we have insisted upon certain objectives and have pressed for a vote of the member nations to decide those questions. We have not always won. Nor have those who opposed us always won, and yet no country has said, "If I can't have my way in every case, I will withdraw from the organization." We and every other member have accepted the vote of the Council and have gone on to work together.

Perhaps it is true that the questions raised at the Council sessions did not involve the largest political issues of the time, and to us many of them may have even seemed trivial, but other countries thought some of the questions involved quite fundamental principles, and yet they accepted the decisions of the United Nations with good grace.

That to me is an enormous achievement. If we can continue to meet together and talk freely about our problems, if we can settle our differences in committees and sessions of the Council as a matter of course, we have gone a long way in preparing for the similar handling of all of our common problems in the Assembly and the Security

Council as well as the other international organizations we have created.

In UNRRA the task is well under way. We have a going concern that is getting relief and rehabilitation supplies to those who need them. The task, however, is larger than we expected when we were planning it. At that time we could not know what devastation and suffering would follow in the wake of war.

It was always recognized that the greatest part of the job would have to be done by the devastated peoples themselves; UNRRA could only supplement these efforts by providing essential imports from abroad which some of the countries lacked the foreign-exchange resources to provide for themselves.

The magnitude of the war far exceeded our expectations, and the destruction wrought by the enemy, as well as the damage of battle caused by our own invading armies, was more extensive than the world has ever known before.

In addition, it has become urgently necessary, in the opinion of the Council of UNRRA, to widen the scope of its responsibilities. New programs have been authorized for Italy and Austria because of our determination to distinguish between those nations and Germany and Japan. Programs have also been authorized for Korea and Formosa, until recently claimed as parts of the Japanese Empire. The needs in these areas are great and will involve the expenditure of a large part of the funds now sought.

Another factor of importance is that the end of the war in the Pacific has at last made it possible to give more than token assistance to China. Here also the needs are enormous and the capacity for self-help is inadequate.

Also limited aid is expected to be given to the two Soviet republics which suffered most severely from the German invasion. The Soviet Union will be able to furnish most of the aid its people require, but the supplementary assistance the White Russian and Ukrainian Republics will receive from UNRRA will fill a pressing need.

When I appeared before your committee during the hearings on the original authorization bill, I stated that the original contributions recommended by the UNRRA Council were based upon the best estimates then available of the size of the job to be done. I also stated that if these estimates proved to be wrong the whole matter would require

new consideration by the Council and new recommendations would have to be laid before the Congress.

At the Council meeting in London this past summer the need for additional funds was considered, and the present request for an additional authorization is now before you in accordance with the Council's recommendation.

Today the world is at peace, but the cessation of hostilities has not solved the problems of starvation and misery in the lands which suffered the direct impact of war. We and our Allies have united through UNRRA to try to alleviate this suffering by common action, and we are now in a position to accomplish that task. If the additional contributions which have been recommended are made available, supplies can be procured and ships can deliver those supplies.

Together we have won the war. Surely we cannot afford to dissipate our unity and cooperation now that victory has been achieved. There is no question of the need. The only question we face is whether we will make our contribution and join with the other United Nations to meet that need.

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLAYTON¹

[Released to the press November 14]

The commencement of these hearings on a new authorization by Congress for United States participation in the work of UNRRA is a reminder to me of the support and cooperation which we have received from this Committee in attempting to solve this whole vast problem of relief and rehabilitation in the war-devastated areas. I was very gratified when the Chairman informed me last July that your Subcommittee would participate in the UNRRA Council deliberations. While the members of this group were in London during August I think they were able to gain for themselves some impression of the magnitude of the problems facing the national delegations to the Third Council Session, and the UNRRA Administration itself. Other members of this Committee

¹ Made on Nov. 14, 1945 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in connection with a bill making further authorizations for UNRRA. Mr. Clayton is U.S. Member of the UNRRA Council.

had an opportunity during the summer to see UNRRA at work in the field as an international relief operation. Therefore, most of us are approaching these deliberations with a sense of the urgency and the importance of the continuance of this country's support for UNRRA.

My own introduction to UNRRA and its problems really occurred in the course of the Council meeting in London. I had been asked by the President to assume the Council membership in June because my responsibilities in the Department for economic affairs made it logical for me to replace Mr. Acheson. Preparation for, and attendance at the Potsdam conference, made it practically impossible for me to familiarize myself in any detail with the UNRRA organization, its past progress, or its future plans until I arrived in London late in July. I then had an opportunity to survey all of the operations of UNRRA up to that time and to form an independent judgment of its significance, its performance, and its future.

UNRRA had been subject to considerable criticism for delay and administrative bungling in getting started. It had been competing unsuccessfully with military operations and other wartime activities for competent personnel and for the supplies and facilities which were necessary to do its job effectively. So long as total war continued in the Pacific, I knew UNRRA would have to face a continuation of these difficulties. These obstacles, however, were largely removed by the surrender of Japan which occurred in the course of the Council's deliberations.

The end of hostilities in Europe three months prior to the Council meeting had already burdened UNRRA with many other problems of relief and rehabilitation. Our armies and those of our Allies, which had been carrying the major burden of civilian supply to western Europe and the Mediterranean countries, were quite rightfully eager to shift that responsibility as soon as possible. A similar situation developed in eastern Europe where all supply and transport were necessarily under the control of the Soviet military command until victory over Germany was achieved. Then and then only could civilian governments and agencies begin to undertake their share of the work. We therefore realized that UNRRA, in the course of the summer, was entering upon the period of full-scale operations. It

was the only functioning relief organization able to take over from the military and the only instrument through which all the European countries, as well as the other United Nations, could concert their common interests in helping to restore some semblance of economic order to that continent.

The urgency of the relief and rehabilitation problem in the Far East was equally apparent. The abrupt end of the war with Japan posed the immediate problem of relief for occupied China, a world responsibility for which no agency was sufficiently prepared except UNRRA. Although UNRRA of course had not anticipated beginning actual operations in the Far East on such short notice, it had established many months previously a mission in China which was working closely with the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. Not only had the plans for relief distribution been tentatively agreed upon but also preliminary screening of a target program for China had been completed and was before the Council for consideration. The fact that UNRRA's plans and personnel were so well prepared to assume immediate operating responsibilities made it easy for the Council to agree provisionally on the scope of UNRRA activities and expenditures in China, pending a further review when the mission on the spot could make reports of actual conditions.

The United States Delegation to the Council meeting, on which I was fortunate in having broad and competent representation from all the interested agencies of this Government, as well as from the Congress, reached early agreement on several objectives. We decided that the needs of all the liberated areas which were not to be under the continuing control of the military and which had insufficient foreign-exchange resources to purchase essential relief supplies abroad could best be met through a single channel. The use of any agency other than UNRRA for these new responsibilities would have meant creating a competing unilateral relief organization, which would have immediately indicated to the world that we doubted the feasibility of international cooperation. We therefore agreed to seek extension of UNRRA operations to Italy and Austria in Europe, and to Korea and Formosa in the Far East.

I would also like to mention in this connection the limited program of relief and rehabilitation assistance through UNRRA to the two Soviet re-

publics of the Ukraine and White Russia. Any invaded country is entitled to seek UNRRA assistance provided that the established procedures and policies for such assistance, as agreed upon among the member nations and embodied in the UNRRA resolutions, are observed. The Soviet Union had made an application for UNRRA aid shortly in advance of the Council meeting in the amount of \$700,000,000, which was only enough to cover a part of the minimum supplies essential to relieve their civilian population on terms similar to those of adjacent areas.

In the course of discussing this application with the Soviet Delegation, I emphasized that I did not see how such a program could be included in the UNRRA budget without serious penalty to other receiving countries. I also felt the people of America, as well as those of other contributing countries, would not sympathize with relief assistance of this magnitude to a country which had some foreign-exchange resources at the expense of countries which had none, though admittedly the Russian resources were inadequate to meet the necessary rehabilitation and reconstruction supplies which the U.S.S.R. would have to secure from abroad. The Soviet Delegation ultimately accepted our point of view and agreed to substitute for their original application one for \$250,000,000, to be used exclusively for food and certain other relief articles in White Russia and the Ukraine, the two most devastated Soviet areas. It was understood that UNRRA operations should be carried forward in these two republics just as in any other country receiving UNRRA assistance, with an UNRRA mission establishing the validity of requirements on the spot and observing distribution. This application for limited relief and rehabilitation assistance has already been reviewed under the regular UNRRA procedure for certification of ability to pay, and the two Russian republics have been determined by five UNRRA member governments, including the United States, to require the limited assistance requested.

The Delegation was also aware of the concern in many quarters that UNRRA might be undertaking rehabilitation responsibilities for a longer term than that originally envisaged. We concluded that if a cut-off date for UNRRA operations were established, the receiving countries would have a greater incentive to maximize their indigenous production of relief supplies. The

Delegation therefore agreed to recommend a stoppage of UNRRA shipments to Europe not later than the end of 1946, and a similar stoppage of shipments to the Far East not later than three months thereafter.

In reviewing the criticisms which had been leveled at UNRRA in the past and the corrective measures that might be taken to improve participation in UNRRA activities by member nations, the United States Delegation felt that the governments concerned should take a more active interest in furnishing supplies, services, and competent personnel to UNRRA. We also decided that it would be desirable for the Director General to have the assistance and advice of the Council, through the Central Committee, in determining equitable distribution of UNRRA's resources among the various receiving countries.

Lastly, my advisers were aware that there remained many unsettled policy questions with regard to UNRRA displaced-persons operations. We knew that several Council members did not feel UNRRA should give any assistance to displaced persons without the consent of the government of origin. Such a restriction would not be acceptable to the American public, and UNRRA would face an impossible task administratively if it could not undertake the care of all categories of displaced persons for which it was responsible without reference to repatriability, or to race, creed, and political belief. Also, in scaling UNRRA demands down to a minimum, we recognized that the administration should not have to advance the cost of supplies needed for the care of displaced persons in enemy territory when such charges were ultimately to be borne by the enemy country itself. The Delegation therefore determined to recommend that the occupying authorities should furnish these supplies and be responsible for recovering their cost later from enemy assets.

As the record will show, and as most of you are aware, we succeeded in attaining all of our objectives at the Council meeting in London. In many instances, agreement was not reached with the member nations without considerable debate and in some instances only after major differences of opinion had been resolved. Nevertheless, agreement was reached on a basis which I believe was in the interests of the United States and also in the interests of UNRRA and all member nations.

The very fact that such a meeting of the minds was achieved is a most encouraging sign that international cooperation on matters of common concern is possible.

I feel that the recommendations of the London Council meeting, which are financially embodied in the new legislation being considered by this Committee, represent a program which is in our best interests. I believe this Committee's examination of the problem before us will justify my sincere conviction that we are asking Congress to do what is right and necessary as our share of world relief and rehabilitation.

This Committee must reach conclusions on the two major aspects of the relief and rehabilitation problems which the world now faces—the need and the method. I have no doubt of your conclusion as to the need on the basis of the facts which are available and which will be laid before you. Nor have I any doubt as to your acceptance of the urgency and the necessity that this Government take the promptest possible action to announce to the world by legislative action our willingness to play our part in this great task. I hope also that this Committee will reaffirm that in UNRRA we have the proper method of furnishing relief and rehabilitation assistance.

I have recently heard criticisms to the effect that UNRRA is a cumbersome and ineffective mechanism, and that we should substitute for it a national relief agency. I am convinced that such ideas are held by relatively few of our citizens and arise chiefly from a failure to consider all aspects of the problem.

We, as a nation, have committed ourselves to international cooperation and collaboration. UNRRA is the first operating experiment in the implementation of this policy. I have recognized difficulties and weaknesses in the UNRRA administration, which are also recognized by the Director General, Governor Lehman, and I will do all in my power as this Government's representative on the Council to help overcome or correct them. Any alternative method for giving relief and rehabilitation assistance to countries without sufficient foreign-exchange and credit resources to meet the problem themselves is, to my mind, unthinkable and impractical.

¹ Statement prepared in the Division of Chinese Affairs, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

² Not printed.

Assistance to China in Effecting Japanese Surrender¹

The United States is using its facilities in the China area to assist the Chinese Government in effecting the surrender, disarmament, and repatriation of the Japanese armed forces in China, who number approximately two million men. The Chinese authorities lack the shipping and other forms of transport necessary to convey their armed forces to various areas in China in order to accomplish the above-stated task. The Chinese authorities have therefore sought our assistance in transporting Chinese troops for that purpose. We have granted the Chinese request not only because we had available shipping in the Far East but also because we felt it a responsibility on our part to assist our Chinese Allies to effect the surrender, disarmament, and repatriation of the Japanese armed forces in China at the earliest possible date.

The activities of our armed forces in the Far East, including the transport of Chinese troops, are being carried out solely for the purposes indicated above. It is neither our purpose nor our desire to become involved in the internal affairs of China.

United States Forces in Korea

[Released to the press November 16]

United States forces in Korea have been faced with many problems since they first landed on September 8. Some of these problems were foreseen and others, with the turn of events, were unexpected.

Because of the distribution of Allied forces at the time of Japanese surrender, General Order No. 1, which the Allied governments through General MacArthur required the Japanese Government to issue, directed Japanese forces in Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel to surrender to Soviet forces, while those south of the thirty-eighth parallel were to surrender to United States forces.² This operational line was intended to be temporary and to serve only to fix responsibility for the purpose of carrying out the aims of the General Order. It was realized, however, that this line, even though temporary, might have the

A

effect of jeopardizing the fundamental unity of the country. The United States commander, therefore, was given complete authority to settle with the Soviet commander any local problems caused by the unnatural division of the country. Practical difficulties in the accomplishment of this desired aim have been encountered locally, however, and in order to overcome these difficulties the United States Government has taken the subject up with the Soviet Government in Moscow with the suggestion that they be solved either through local negotiations, between the two occupational commanders, or on a governmental level. The practical problems include the reintegration of communications and the economic unification of the country, the realization of which would establish the country in a sound position.

Further problems arise from the fact that the leaders of Korea have been ruthlessly dominated and exploited for 35 years by the Japanese and therefore need political and administrative assistance.³ General Hodge, appointed by General MacArthur to command United States forces in Korea, arrived at Seoul, the capital, with a firm program for the elimination of Japanese from the government and the substitution of Korean leaders in their stead. He envisaged his own position as being merely that of a coordinator and adviser. Because of Japanese predominance in administrative positions and the need for their sudden removal he found it necessary to assume, with United States personnel, the major burdens of governmental responsibility.

Many prominent and capable Koreans had taken up voluntary or enforced exile from their native land as a result of the Japanese occupation, some of them in the United States. They had a substantial popular following in the Korean underground, which the Japanese had never been able to eliminate. These exiles represent democratic ideals, and the United States authorities in Korea are encouraging their return, as rapidly as transportation difficulties will allow, to work with local Korean leaders in the unification of the diverse political elements.

The sudden release from oppression has resulted in the equally sudden emergence of many political parties, happy in their new-found opportunity for free speech. As might be expected in the establishment of a new nation, there are many differences among these parties and some have found reason

for complaint, not only in the activities of the other political groups but in the policies of the reorganized government.

The United States Government, in consultation with the Soviet Government, is making every effort to improve the situation in Korea and hopes that communications, trade, and free passage of individuals will be resumed in the near future between the north and south of the country, thus facilitating the ultimate establishment of an independent and unified Korea.

Anniversary of Philippine Commonwealth

Statement by THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House November 15]

November 15, 1945 marks the tenth anniversary of the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Those 10 years were set aside by Congress, and approved by the Filipino people, as a period of preparation for independence. The Philippines and the Filipinos were to have been given those 10 years to prepare their national economy and their national government to assume the full responsibilities of nationhood.

Neither we nor they knew, in 1935, what a test the Philippines would be called upon to pass in 1941—the test of war. The Filipino people went through the ordeals of war and of Japanese occupation in a manner to their immortal credit. It was a credit to them, and to us, who led the Philippines along the 40-year road from serfdom under Spain to commonwealth status. But more than that it was a credit to those ideals of democracy and human dignity which America introduced into the Philippines in 1898, ideals which took root there so firmly as to survive every savage effort of the Japanese to uproot them.

The Filipino people are spiritually worthy of independence. They have won their spurs as a nation. We will honor our promise and our pledges to them. The United States stands ready to aid the heroes of the Philippines in every way we can.

The United States honors the Filipino people on this tenth anniversary of Commonwealth Day.

³ For article on Korea's internal political structure, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1944, p. 578.

Reduction of Required Gold Coverage of Philippine Currency

[Released to the press by the White House November 14]

The President on November 14 addressed the following letter to Sergio Osmeña, President of the Philippines:

I have for some time delayed my approval of House Bill No. 176 of the first Philippine Congress, which provides a reduction of the required gold coverage of Philippine currency. This delay has been due to the fact that there have been persistent charges that a sizable fraction of the Members of the Philippine Congress had been guilty of collaboration with the enemy, and I have not wanted my approval of the act to be distorted into approval of collaboration.

I am informed, however, that the provisions of House Bill No. 176 are necessary to the effective conduct of the Philippine Government and I accordingly have approved the act. At the same time, I should like to emphasize that my signature is in no sense an approval of the presence in the Philippine Congress of any person who has given aid to the enemy or his political policies.

Extradition Treaty Between United States and Canada

TRANSMITTAL OF PROTOCOL

[Released to the press by the White House November 16]

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a protocol, signed in Ottawa on October 3, 1945, to be annexed to, and to form a part of, the extradition treaty between the United States of America and Canada signed in Washington on April 29, 1942.

I transmit also for the information of the Senate a report on the protocol¹ made to me by the Secretary of State.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 16, 1945.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Spruille Braden as a member of the Board of Foreign Service Personnel and Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, effective November 13, 1945.

George H. Butler as Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, effective October 24, 1945.

Fisher Howe as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective November 13, 1945.

Garrison Norton as Deputy Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy, effective November 1, 1945.

The following designations have been made in the office of the Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs:

Jonathan Bingham as Special Assistant, and also Chief of the Alien Enemy Control Section, effective November 14, 1945.

James H. Wright as Special Assistant, effective November 1, 1945.

Change in the Name of the Commodities Division to the International Resources Division²

Purpose. This order is issued to change the name of the Commodities Division in order to reflect more accurately its functions.

1 *Change in name of the division.* The name of the Commodities Division of the Office of International Trade Policy is hereby changed to International Resources Division (routing symbol IR).

2 *Functions of the division.* The functions of the division shall remain unchanged.

3 *Orders amended.* Departmental Order 1319 of May 1, 1945, and any other orders the provisions of which are in conflict herewith, are accordingly amended.

JAMES F. BYRNES

NOVEMBER 1, 1945

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Consular Offices

The American Consulate General at Rangoon, Burma, was reestablished on November 2, 1945.

The American Vice Consulate at Puntarenas, Costa Rica, has been closed to the public as of October 31, 1945.

¹ Not printed.

² Departmental Order 1355, issued Nov. 5, 1945, and effective Nov. 1, 1945.

Cultural Cooperation With the Soviet Union

Address by CHARLES J. CHILD¹

[Released to the press November 18]

I can remember a certain day in late August, warm and sunny. I sat on a grassy bank watching a curious sight: a crew of men were loading birch logs on to the train tender as fuel. I was in Siberia, somewhere in the vicinity of Irkutsk, and the year was 1928. The thought occurred to me at the time: "Here is a vast and beautiful land—very much like our own—a land of many climates and many bloods but which is still struggling to overcome an almost impossible transportation problem by any means at hand."

Well, we have all traveled a long way since then. If you stood on the same bank today you would doubtless see, as a familiar and normal sight, great planes made in the Soviet Union piloted by Soviet personnel, shooting along through the sky at rates undreamed of then.

I think this change aptly symbolizes how the world has shrunk in a few short years. The Soviet people had to overtake their enemies in the matter of transportation and communication. They could not have shared so effectively in winning the war if they had not by superhuman effort been able to revolutionize and modernize their entire system of communications almost overnight. Now the world has shrunk so far that today when a man in Stalingrad sneezes, a man in Brooklyn clutches his hat.

In terms of human contacts this simply means that it is now possible for almost the first time in human history to substitute precise and continuous information for legend, rumor, and gossip. Such precise information is based on actual exchanges of persons, of ideas, of materials, exchanges of knowledge, of skills and arts, and it guarantees that neighbor nations now no longer need to communicate only on the somewhat rarified political level or solely on the economic level. Much of it can proceed directly from person to person as a matter of friendly understanding.

This is a profound change in the basis of human relationships which has in many ways caught us almost unawares. It is a change which has reflected itself in government. The Department of State of today, for example, is gradually emerging as a tripartite instrument—political, economic, cultural—for increasing our knowledge of other peoples and their better knowledge of how we live. The Division of Cultural Cooperation in which I labor works in the fields of science, education, and the arts, and has as its stated policy the stimulation of better understanding through exchanges of persons, knowledge, and skills. It helps in the exchange of technical commissions, leaders, students, musicians, artists, and outstanding examples of their work. The Department is at present seeking to gear itself to its increasing responsibilities to become more effective—not as a rival but as a partner of the non-government groups in these fields in order to stimulate such exchanges to the best advantage.

In this connection I am confident that the vision and imagination of the Soviet people so brilliantly applied to the defense of their own soil is being used effectively in solving the complex problems of peace. But all of us would like to become more familiar with all phases of this great new effort. And we desire to keep them informed of what is being done in the United States which affects the lives of our artists, writers, musicians.

The problems of peace, no less urgent than those of war, will absorb the energies of our two peoples for years to come. The real story will be that of the necessary work of reconstruction and reconversion, the work of providing useful jobs in a peacetime world.

Now if we in this country can create successful mechanisms by which our people and the Russian people can speak more directly to each other through the medium of the arts, and use this medium not only in the work of reconstruction itself but to get across to each other the best of our solutions, we will have taken the first steps in helping create a new era of solidarity based on realistic friendship, a friendship based on precise

¹ Delivered before the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, New York, N. Y., Nov. 18, 1945. Mr. Child is Adviser on Art and Music in the Division of Cultural Cooperation, Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

and continuous information about each other. Leave legend to the ancients. We want to face the facts.

Today's picture is one of two equals, each confident in his tested strength, each victorious in an exhausting war. In this strength and this confidence we can afford to look each other full in the face and dare to see ourselves as we really are.

Ivan and Sam have fought together and found it good. Now they can sit back over a cup of coffee or a glass of tea, or if you like, sunflower seeds and chewing gum, and make carefully considered plans for the future as old comrades-in-arms in an atmosphere of mutual respect and gratitude. To help this process let us plan how to exchange radio, motion pictures, publications to greater advantage. We should see each other's ballet, theater, paintings, sculpture, and hear each other's music—and not only on the radio. We should fully and freely examine the differences between our schools of art, our music-education systems, our public parks, city plans, and museums. We want a chance to know just why the Red Army Chorus is so good. In other words, we should each put ourselves in a position of being able to benefit by the discoveries and solutions of the other in the world of the arts. And we should be able to evaluate the imperfections which are inherent in all systems, without a sense of shock.

If we do this we can gradually build a trade in ideas which will leave lend-lease far behind in value given and received. For ideas help to create new ideas, and the stock of exchange of this kind of commodity does not dry up or become exhausted. I want to repeat this: the heart of the matter is not just diplomacy, it is not controls, it is not formal gestures, though these factors necessarily enter into the picture; it is mutual confidence, based on day-to-day knowledge of each other; and I think you will appreciate that in the arts above all we have in our hands a force which leaps the barriers of language and goes directly to the hearts and minds of people.

In part we know the kinds of things we will find. It is not for nothing that new editions of *War and Peace* continue to be published here or that Shostakovich and Prokofiev are so enormously popular. Russian ballet has always had its great American audiences and will have them again. Russian plays and Russian choral singing are a part of our common cultural experience. And in the Soviet Union Jack London, Heming-

way, Roy Harris, Copland, and many others are deeply felt. We should strive soberly and carefully to increase such areas of knowledge about each other so that lingering doubts and fears will be dispelled in the light of fuller, more accurate knowledge.

If this process of cross-fertilization is continued and if we adjust our sights to the realities of a shrunken world, the mechanics, devices, rituals, and symbols which continuously force themselves up out of the consciousness of both our peoples may be used for creative rather than destructive ends. But not without constant effort and constant attention to the ends in view.

Now it would seem to me that in our day there can be no greater challenge to intelligent citizens than that of building an enduring friendship between our two peoples. But this enduring friendship cannot be made to grow without the essential contribution of the arts and humanities which show us not only the face but the inner nature of a people. I therefore call upon American and Russian workers in the arts to meet this supreme challenge with courage and mutual confidence. It is a challenge which gives them the opportunity to contribute as partners with their governments to the good health and wholeness of the world—the one world—we live in. To American artists I say: let your creative work really tell the story of the United States in honest terms. We want to let the Russian people know what we are like, the direction of our thinking. We must make known to them the face of America. The arts can contribute notably to this process. To Soviet artists I say: give us the true story of your day-to-day life. We want to know not only the triumphs but the struggles of the Soviet people.

The Department of State will try to strengthen this process with such information and assistance as it is in a position to give, but the bulk of the work will have to be carried out by private, non-government groups. I believe this is a task really worthy of the age we live in, the task of cementing the new foundation of a common structure of understanding. I want to make it clear that this process is not something that will take place spontaneously, it will be the work of many years—of many generations perhaps. Understanding between nations as between individuals does not come overnight. It is the product of unceasing, sober effort, of give and take, of honesty and fair

dealing in the exchange of the products of our skills.

The military might of our two nations is known everywhere. But military might is not the whole story. The enduring spiritual qualities which produce true greatness and victory in battle are of a different order, and are more difficult to know. We still have to convince a somewhat skeptical world that we are not just a nation with a "gadget culture". We have to make increasingly clear the story of our long struggle toward the American ideal of true democracy, in spite of our obvious imperfections. It is a good story and one that deserves to be told. But we can tell it most effectively in the long run through better city planning, better architecture, better schools, and finer and more noble works of art than we have yet achieved. But there are great difficulties to be overcome—the language barrier is very real. It will never be easy for us as a nation to master a Slavic tongue. And the very concepts in which we think will tend to create certain areas of confusion—a confusion of interpretation in our basic concepts. Another difficulty is that of emphasis. We must never expect to agree completely on the things we think of greatest importance. Our two styles of living can never be completely alike—we would not wish them to be; nor will our political and educational institutions be mirror images of each other. These and many other differences between us will materially slow up the process of understanding and at times can be expected to produce moments of friction which must be realistically faced and mastered.

Thus, we see that the task is only begun. The problems are not all solved. We face years of work in our laboratories, our schools, our studies, and workshops, those instruments by which civilization is most truly seen and known. If we share the products of these producing agencies, if we succeed in creating better and better instrumentalities for the spread of our skills, our knowledge, and our arts we will have set ourselves on the road of long-time friendship, based on honest understanding.

If we do this—if we attempt to learn of the Soviet people through their science, education, and arts, and if we in turn tell the story of American life in terms of its practical accomplishments and its spiritual insights, we will have taken wise advantage of our present opportunity—that of creating a true and lasting bond of friendship with the people of the Soviet Union.

Ratification of the Charter of the United Nations

[Released to the press November 18]

Instruments of ratification of the Charter have now been deposited by thirty-nine nations. Since October 24, when the Charter came into force with the deposit of the twenty-ninth instrument of ratification, ten other nations have deposited their instruments of ratification.

Australia, Liberia, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Union of South Africa, Mexico, and Canada have deposited instruments of ratification with the Department of State during November.

Australia

H. V. Evatt, Minister of State for the Department of External Affairs of Australia, deposited the Australian instrument of ratification of the Charter on November 1.

Liberia

The instrument of ratification of the Charter by the Government of Liberia was received by the Department of State from the American Legation in Monrovia and was deposited on November 2.

Costa Rica

Francisco de P. Gutierrez, Ambassador of Costa Rica, deposited on November 2 the instrument of ratification of the Charter by Costa Rica.

Colombia

Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, Ambassador of Colombia, deposited his Government's instrument of ratification of the Charter on November 5.

Union of South Africa

H. T. Andrews, Minister of the Union of South Africa, deposited on November 7 the instrument of ratification of the Charter by the Union of South Africa.

Mexico

Antonio Espinosa de los Monteros, Ambassador of Mexico, deposited the Mexican instrument of ratification of the Charter on November 7.

Canada

Lester B. Pearson, Ambassador of Canada, deposited the Canadian instrument of ratification on November 9.

The President of the United States of America signed his proclamation of the Charter on October 31.

Action Taken on the Charter of the United Nations¹

Country	Dates of deposit of instruments of ratification (1945)	National action by countries which have not deposited ratifications
*Argentina.....	Sept. 24.....	Approved by Chamber of Deputies on Oct. 31. To be sent to Senate.
Australia.....	Nov. 1.....	
Belgium.....	
Bolivia.....	Nov. 14.....	
*Brazil.....	Sept. 21.....	Ratified by President on Oct. 15.
*Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.	Oct. 24.....	
Canada.....	Nov. 9.....	
*Chile.....	Oct. 11.....	
*China.....	Sept. 28.....	
Colombia.....	Nov. 5.....	
Costa Rica.....	Nov. 2.....	
*Cuba.....	Oct. 15.....	
*Czechoslovakia.....	Oct. 19.....	
*Denmark.....	Oct. 9.....	
*Dominican Republic.	Sept. 4.....	
Ecuador.....	
*Egypt.....	Oct. 22.....	
*El Salvador.....	Sept. 26.....	
Ethiopia.....	Nov. 13.....	
*France.....	Aug. 31.....	
Greece.....	Oct. 25.....	
Guatemala.....	
*Haiti.....	Sept. 27.....	Ratified Nov. 1.
Honduras.....	
India.....	Oct. 30.....	
*Iran.....	Oct. 16.....	
Iraq.....	Ratified by Queen on Nov. 16.
*Lebanon.....	Oct. 15.....	
Liberia.....	Nov. 2.....	
*Luxembourg.....	Oct. 17.....	
Mexico.....	Nov. 7.....	Ratified by King on Nov. 16.
Netherlands.....	
*New Zealand.....	Sept. 19.....	
*Nicaragua.....	Sept. 6.....	
Norway.....	
Panama.....	Nov. 13.....	
*Paraguay.....	Oct. 12.....	
Peru.....	Oct. 31.....	
*Philippine Commonwealth.	Oct. 11.....	
*Poland ²	Oct. 24.....	
*Saudi Arabia.....	Oct. 18.....	
*Syria.....	Oct. 19.....	
*Turkey.....	Sept. 28.....	

Foreign Commerce Weekly

The following articles of interest to readers of the BULLETIN appeared in the November 3 issue of *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, a publication of the Department of Commerce, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents each:

"Modern Egypt Initiates Vegetable Dehydration", by Robert Bailey Elwood, assistant agricultural officer, American Legation, Cairo.

"Construction Machinery—São Paulo Opportunities", by Frederic C. Fornes, Jr., consul, Consulate General, São Paulo.

In the issue of November 17 appears the following article:

"Mexico's Leather Goods: Development and Trends", based on reports from various consulates in Mexico.

Country	Dates of deposit of instruments of ratification (1945)	National action by countries which have not deposited ratifications
*Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.	Oct. 24.....	Senate approved Charter Nov. 1. To be sent to Chamber of Representatives.
Union of South Africa.	Nov. 7.....	
*Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. ³	Oct. 24.....	
*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.	Oct. 20.....	
*United States of America.	Aug. 8.....	
Uruguay.....	
Venezuela.....	Nov. 15.....	
*Yugoslavia.....	Oct. 19.....	

¹One of twenty-nine countries named in the Protocol of Deposit of Ratifications signed by the Secretary of State on Oct. 24, 1945.

²Compiled as of Nov. 16, 1945 by the Treaty Branch, Division of Research and Publication, Department of State.

³The Charter was signed on behalf of Poland on Oct. 15, 1945 at Washington and for the other governments at San Francisco on June 26, 1945.

⁴The deposit of the Soviet instrument of ratification at 3:07 p.m. on Oct. 24, 1945 brought the Charter into force.

Nobel Peace Prize of 1945 Awarded to Cordell Hull

EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT OF NOBEL COMMITTEE AND MR. HULL

[Released to the press November 14]

Message from Gunnar Jahn, President of the Nobel Committee, to former Secretary of State Cordell Hull:

The Nobel Committee of the Storting has the honor to inform you that the Committee has awarded to you the Nobel Peace Prize for 1945. The amount of the prize is about 121,000 Swedish kroner. Letter follows. The Committee invites you to come to Oslo to receive the prize on December 10. Will you please inform it whether you can come.

Reply of Mr. Hull to Gunnar Jahn:

I have received your message stating that the Nobel Committee of the Storting has awarded to me the Nobel Peace Prize for 1945. I have been deeply moved by this great honor—one of the

greatest that can come to anyone anywhere.

Enduring world peace, based on justice and fair-dealing, is mankind's sole hope for the survival of our modern civilization. There is no cause more worthy of utmost human effort. I am particularly happy that whatever contribution I have been able to make to that precious cause has received this mark of recognition from the statesmen of a country which itself has done so much toward the advancement of world peace.

It is a matter of keen disappointment to me that the present state of my health renders it virtually impossible for me to go to Oslo on December 10 to receive the prize. Please express to the Committee my most sincere appreciation and my profound regret that I shall be unable to avail myself of an opportunity to express in person my gratitude to them for their generous action.

STATEMENT BY MR. HULL

[Released to the press November 12]

Naturally, I am most gratified to receive the Nobel Peace Award.

Important as has been the struggle for peace in the past, it must be intensified and broadened if the human race is to be preserved in this new and dangerous atomic age. This is a task for the peoples of all nations. To this end there must be increased effort to promote and maintain a more

alert and better informed public opinion throughout the world. But we must never forget that to achieve the great goal of lasting peace it is imperative that there be continued unity, friendly understanding, and common effort among the people and statesmen of the major United Nations who bore the principal burden in the war against the Axis powers.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN TO MR. HULL

NOVEMBER 12, 1945

MY DEAR MR. HULL:

The American people join with me in congratulations. The honor that has come to you is deeply deserved. No one in a position of great responsibility has striven with more persistence and statesmanship for peace and for the kind of world that makes peace possible.

I feel a sense of personal humility that I should be the one to tender these congratulations on behalf

of the American people. That pleasant task should have fallen, God willing, to my predecessor, President Roosevelt, with whom you worked so long and so well.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

The Honorable CORDELL HULL
Wardman Park Hotel
Washington, D. C.

THE CONGRESS

Atomic Energy Act of 1945. H. Rept. 1186, Part 2, 79th Cong., to accompany H.R. 4566. 6 pp.

Postwar Economic Policy and Planning. Eighth Report of the House Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, pursuant to H. Res. 60, (a resolution authorizing the continuation of the special committee on postwar economic policy and planning: Economic Reconstruction in Europe. H. Rept. 1205, 79th Cong. iii, 51 pp.

Granting Certain Privileges and Immunities to International Organizations and Their Employees. H. Rept. 1203, 79th Cong., to accompany H.R. 4489. 14 pp. [Favorable report.]

Supplemental Estimates of Appropriation for the Department of State. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting supplemental estimates of appropriation for the fiscal year 1946 in the amount of \$2,000,000 for the Department of State. H. Doc. 372, 79th Cong. 2 pp.

Authorizing New Appropriation for Participation in Activities of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Message from the President of the United States transmitting his request to Congress to authorize a new appropriation of \$1,350,000,000 for participation in the activities of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. H. Doc. 378, 79th Cong. 3 pp.

Authorizing Rehabilitation on the Island of Guam. S. Rept. 705, 79th Cong. 2 pp. [Favorable report.]

Providing for the Appointment of Representatives of the United States in the Organs and Agencies of the United Nations, and To Make Other Provisions With Respect to the Participation of the United States in Such Organization. S. Rept. 717, 79th Cong. 7 pp. [Favorable report.]

Elimination of German Resources for War: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Res. 107 (78th Congress) and S. Res. 146 (79th Congress) authorizing a study of war

mobilization problems. Part 6, November 1945, additional material submitted by the War Department. vi, 18 pp.

First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescission Bill, 1946: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, on H.R. 4407, an act reducing certain appropriations and contract authorizations available for the fiscal year 1946, and June 30, 1945, and for other purposes. ii, 573 pp. [Indexed.]

ADVERTISEMENT

Official Daily Service:



• The *Federal Register* presents the only official publication of the text of Federal regulations and notices restricting or expanding commercial operations.

• All Federal agencies are required by law to submit their documents of general applicability and legal effect to the *Federal Register* for daily publication.

A sample copy and additional information on requests to the Federal Register, National Archives, Washington 25, D. C.

\$15 a year • \$1.50 a month

Order from

SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, 25, D. C.